WLA 34. Nuclear Weapons Dismantling Procedure
Nuclear Weapons Dismantling Procedure
Reference: derived from United Nations A/62/650
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling,
Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination – April 2007
Updated from the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated in November 1997 as
United Nations document A/C.1/52/7.
As aids to research and cross-referencing, alpha-roman-numeric cross-references to A/62/650 sections are conserved and displayed in green. Also, the original .pdf page numbering to the corresponding pages of UNGA A/62/650 (English) have been retained and are periodically displayed in green, thus:
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(Above 4 is the corresponding page.) Please note that Article 20 has no cross-reference page listings, since Article 20 doesn’t originate from A/62/650.
Contents
Page
Contents …………………………..…….. 1
Preamble ………………………………… 3
1. General Obligations …………………. 5
A. State Obligations……………………….. 5
B. Obligations of Persons…………….….. 5
2. Definitions …………………………….. 6
A. States and Persons ……………………. 6
B. Nuclear Weapons ………..……………. 6
C. Nuclear Energy, Explosion, and Explosive Device ……………….………………………… 6
D. Nuclear Material …………………….. 6
E. Nuclear Facilities ……………………. 7
F. Nuclear Activities ……………………. 8
G. Verification …………………….…… 10
H. Delivery Vehicles ……………….…. 11
3. Declarations …………………………. 12
A. Nuclear Weapons ……………….…. 12
B. Nuclear Material ……………………..…….. 12
C. Nuclear Facilities ……………………..……. 13
D. Delivery Vehicles ………………………..…. 13
4. Phases for Implementation ……………….…. 13
A. General Requirements ……………………..….. 13
B. Extension of Deadlines ……………..…………. 13
C. Reciprocity in Extensions …………………….. 13
D. Phases ………………………………..………. 13
E. Special Provision …………………………….. 14
5. Verification ………………………………….. 15
A. Elements of Verification Regime ……………. 15
B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials
Subject to Verification …………………………………15
C. Rights and Obligations of States Parties with Respect to Verification ………………………………15
D. Confidence-Building Measures……………….16
E. Relation to Other Verification Arrangements …………………………………………………………….16
F. Implementation ……………….………………..16
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6. National Implementation Measures ……… 17
A. Legislative Implementation ………………… 17
B. Relations between the State Party
and the Agency ….……………………………….. 17
C. Confidentiality ………………………………. 18
D. Relation to implementation measures assumed
or required under other arrangements ………….. 18
7. Rights and Obligations of Persons ……… 18
A. Criminal Procedure …………………………. 18
B. Responsibility to Report Violations ………. 18
C. Protection for Persons Providing Information …………………………………………………………. 18
8. Agency ………………………………………. 19
A. General Provisions …………………………… 19
B. Conference of the States Parties……………… 20
C. Executive Council………………………….. 21
D. Technical Secretariat ………………………. 23
E. Privileges and Immunities…………………. 25
F. Registry and Other Databases ……………….. 25
G. World Monitoring System …………………….. 26
9. Nuclear Weapons …………………………… 27
A. General Requirements………………….….. 27
B. Procedures for Dismantling Nuclear Weapons …………………………………………………….. 27
C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons ……………………………………………………… 27
10. Nuclear Material …………………….…… 27
A. Reconstruction and Documentation …………. 27
B. Control of Special Nuclear Material …… 28
C. Licensing Requirements …………………. 28
D. Relation to other International Agreements …………………………………………………….. 28
11. Nuclear Facilities……………………… 28
A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities ………..…… 28
B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites……………… 29
C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and
reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials
storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle
locations outside of facilities…………………. 30
D. Activities at nuclear facilities …………… 30
12. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles ……………………………………………. 30
13. Activities Not Prohibited Under This Act ……………………………… 31
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14. Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement ……………………………… 31
A. Consultation, Cooperation and Fact-finding ………………………………………….….. 31
B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to
Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions .. 34
C. Settlement of Disputes ………………… 35
15. Entry into Force ……………………… 36
A. Conditions of Entry into Force ………… 36
B. State Waiver of Entry into Force Requirements ……………………………………………………… 36
16. Financing ……………………………… 36
17. Amendments ………………………….. 36
18. Scope and Application of Act …………………………………………………. 38
A. Relation to Other International Agreements …………………………………………………. 38
B. Status of the Annexes ………………..….. 38
C. Duration and Withdrawal ……………….. 38
D. Reservations …………………………….. 38
19. Conclusion of Convention ……………. 38
A. Signature …………………………………… 30
B. Ratification …………………………………. 30
C. Accession ………..…………………….…….. 30
D. Depository…………………………..……..30
E. Authentic Texts …………………………….. 30
20. Depleted Uranium Specifications ………… 39
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes ………………………………………………. 50
Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance ……. 50
Annex 1: Nuclear Activities ……………………. 50
A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities ……………………………………………………….. 50
B. Schedule of Nuclear Activities ………….…… 51
Annex 2: Nuclear Weapon Components ……. 52
Annex 3: List of countries and geographical regions for the purpose of Article 8.23 (VIII.C. A/62/650 ………………………………………………….. 53
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Annex 4: List of countries with nuclear power reactors …………………………..……………….. 54
Annex 5: List of countries and geographical regions with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors ………………………….. 54
Notes:
1. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UNGA#A/62/650) was prepared by a consortium of scientists, lawyers, disarmament experts, academics and officials as a discussion document to assist in deliberations and possible negotiations leading to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It outlines legal, technical and political elements which could be utilized in an actual nuclear weapons convention or package/framework of agreements. The drafters did not assume that the final agreed convention or package of agreements would be exactly the same as in their model or in this Act. The drafters do however believe that the Model (upon which this Act is based) demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of nuclear disarmament. For discussion on these issues see Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, IPPNW, Cambridge USA, 2007.
2. [Square brackets] refers to text which has not been agreed by all the drafters or which suggests alternative approaches. The text makes reference to a “Verification Annex” which would form an integral part of the final Dismantling Procedure, but is not included in this Act.
3. Footnotes to this partially engrossed version primarily describe the types of amendments made from WLA#34 (2006), using abbreviations after initial amendment type labeling within the footnotes: technical/legal (improvements of A/62/650 over A/C.1/52/7), constitutional consistency, or corrective/integrative.
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The Provisional World Parliament originally derived the base text for the Dismantling Procedure from the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention of United Nations General Assembly Official Document A/C.1/52/7, produced by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms in association with Costa Rica and NGOs. (http://www.ialana.net) Elimination Protocol was adopted as World Legislative Act #34 by 9th session of Provisional World Parliament convened in Tripoli, Libya, on 12 April 2006, under Article 19 of the Constitution for the Federation of Earth.
At the 11th Session of the Provisional World Parliament, 4th July 2009, convened at the Van Niwas Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Nainital, Uttarakhand, India, the Parliament adopted substantial amendments to the Act, drawing from UNGA A/62/650 and from the draft bill Depleted Uranium Specifications.
The Parliament adopted Act name change to
Dismantling Procedure
Preamble
We the people of the Earth, and those States Parties committed to the Earth Constitution:
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their continued use has catastrophic consequences for all the creatures of this Earth;
Noting that the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon life on earth are uncontrollable whether in time or space, and whether detonating or not;
Aware that amongst weapons of mass destruction, the abolition of which is recognized as being in the collective security interest of all people and States, nuclear weapons are unprecedented and unequalled in destructive potential;
Affirming that the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family include the right to life, liberty, peace and the security of person;
Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons;
Recognizing that numerous regions, including Antarctica, Outer Space,[1] Latin America, the Sea Bed[2], the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia[3] have already been established as nuclear weapon free zones, where possession, production, development, deployment, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are forever prohibited, and desiring to extend this benefit to the entire planet for the good of all life;
Determined to eliminate the risks of environmental pollution by radioactive waste and other radioactive matter associated with nuclear weapons and to ensure that the bounty and beauty of the Earth shall remain the common heritage of all of us and our descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;
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Recognizing the universal need for environmentally safe, sustainable energy;
Gravely concerned that the detonation of nuclear weapons may be brought about not only intentionally by war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanical error or failure, and that the very existence and gravity of these threats of nuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which is antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Earth Constitution and other rights instruments;
Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals, the economic and social costs and waste of intellectual talent occasioned by these arsenals and the efforts required to prevent their use, the dangers inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons and the attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologically catastrophic effects of any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects of mutations on the genetic pool and numerous other risks associated with nuclear weapons;
Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as indications of a progression toward the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction;
Recognizing that all life is sacred and that there is a moral imperative to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction;
Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as an indication of progress towards the prohibition and elimination of weapons which are indiscriminate and cause unnecessary suffering;
Welcoming also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in particular the recognition of individual responsibility for crimes involved in employing weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate;[4]
Believing that the threat and use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with civilized norms, standards of morality and humanitarian law which prohibit the use of inhumane weapons and those with indiscriminate effects;
Recalling Resolution 1(I), adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946 at the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the many subsequent resolutions of the United Nations which call for the elimination of atomic weapons;
Recalling also the Final Document of the United Nations First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 1978, which calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons;
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Mindful of the solemn obligations of States made in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and achieve nuclear disarmament, and to further commitments on specific steps to achieve nuclear disarmament[5] in the “Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” ” agreed in 1995, and the “Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” agreed in 2000;[6]
Convinced that the elimination of nuclear weapons is an important step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament;
Welcoming the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996, which concluded “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”, and concluded unanimously that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”;
Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolutions 51/45 M, of 10 December 1996, 52/38 O of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998, 54/54 Q of 1 December 1999, 55/33 X of 20 November 2000, 56/24 S of 29 November 2001, 57/85 of 22 November 2002, 58/46 of 8 December 2003, 59/83 of 3 December 2004, 60/76 of 8 December 2005, and 61/83 of 6 December 2006 [7] which underline the nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice and call “upon all States to fulfil that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations … leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination”;
Convinced that world law prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination is required to abolish these weapons from the Earth;
Have agreed as follows:
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1. General Obligations
1.1. State Obligations (Section “I.A.” A/62/650)
1.1.1. (Reserved) [Editorial note: Original provisions of 1.1.1. were redundant to World Legislative Acts #1 and #13.]
1.1.2. Each State Party undertakes:
1.1.2.01. To disable and dismantle all nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and other world legislation;
1.1.2.02. To disable and dismantle all nuclear weapons the State abandoned on the territory of another State, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and other world legislation;
1.1.2.03. To submit all nuclear facilities to preventive controls; (reduced from A/C1/52/7)
1.1.2.04. To disable and dismantle all nuclear weapons facilities the State owns or possesses, or that are located in any
place under the States jurisdiction or control, or to convert nuclear weapons facilities to weapons dismantling facilities or other facilities not prohibited by world legislation;
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1.1.2.05. [To disable or dismantle all facilities, systems or sub-systems designed or used in the command or control of nuclear weapons, or convert such facilities, systems or subsystems to purposes not prohibited under world law;]
1.1.2.06. To dismantle or convert for purposes not prohibited under world law all nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon components;
1.1.2.07. To place all special nuclear material under preventive[8] controls as specified in this Convention;
1.1.2.08. To participate in good faith in activities aimed at the promotion of transparency with
respect to nuclear weapons and related technologies and the promotion of education for the purposes of detecting and preventing activities prohibited under world legislation;
1.1.2.09. To report violations of world law to the Agency [and to cooperate to the fullest with the Agency’s investigative, monitoring and verification functions;] [and to provide to the Agency all information requested by the Agency for the purposes of implementing world legislation, except such information as may be with-held for legitimate international or national security or trade secret concerns;]
1.1.2.10. To enact all domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of world legislation.
1.1.3. These obligations apply equally to nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes. (exception from A/C.1/52/7 was stricken.)
1.1.4. The World Court and the World Disarmament Agency (the Agency) and States Party must not interpret these obligations to prohibit activities consistent with the application and implementation of the provisions of this Act [including but not limited to transfer of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for dismantling or disposal, and nuclear disarmament research and verification thereof].
1.2. Obligations of Persons (Section “I.B.” A/62/650)
1.2.1. The following acts are crimes for which persons shall be held responsible regardless of their position, residence, citizenship or country of incorporation:
1.2.1.1. To engage or attempt to engage in any acts listed in subparagraphs 1.1 through 1.7, inclusive, of this Article;
1.2.1.2. To aid, abet, or otherwise assist, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Act or other world legislation.
1.2.2. The fact that the present Act provides criminal responsibility for individuals does not reduce the responsibility of States under international law.
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2. Definitions
States and Persons (Section “II.A.” A/62/650)
2.01.1. “Nuclear Weapons State” means a state which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
2.01.2. “Nuclear Capable State” means a State which has developed or has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and which is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(2 definitions were dropped since A/C.1/52/7)
2.02.”State Party” means any nation that has ratified the Constitution for the Federation of Earth.
2.03. “Person” means a natural or legal person.
Nuclear Weapons (Section “II.B.” A/62/650)
2.04. “Nuclear Weapon” means:
2.04.1.. Any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes;
2.04.2.. Any nuclear explosive device;
2.04.3.. Any radiological weapon; or
2.04.4. Any weapon which is designed to include a nuclear explosive device as a
trigger or other component.
2.05. “Nuclear Weapon Component” means any constituent part of a nuclear weapon [excluding the special nuclear material when separated from other components[9]].
2.06. “Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapons delivery vehicle that has been constructed, developed, flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle.
2.07. “Plutonium Pit” means the core element of a nuclear weapon’s primary or fission
component.
2.08. “Radiological Weapon” means any weapon that disperses radioactive material or uses radioactive material as a primary material in its construction.
2.09. “Warhead” means the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system. Warheads consist
of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives, related firing mechanisms and
containment structure.
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Nuclear Energy, Explosion, and Explosive Device (Section “II.C.” A/62/650)
2.10. “Nuclear Energy” means energy released from the nucleus of an atom either spontaneously or through interaction with other particles and/or electromagnetic
radiation.
2.11. “Nuclear Explosion” means the release of significant amounts of nuclear energy on a time-scale faster than or comparable to chemical explosives [including micro-fission, micro-fusion or miniaturized devices of any yield].
2.12. “Nuclear Explosive Device” means any device capable of undergoing a nuclear explosion, irrespective of its purpose. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, as well as devices or assemblies which belong to a nuclear explosive device or are a modification of such suitable for development and testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.
2.13. “Significant Amount of Nuclear Energy” means more than the energy released by radioactive decay and spontaneous fission and may be much smaller than the maximum energy yield of the largest chemical explosions.
Nuclear Material (Section “II.D.” A/62/650)
2.14. “Nuclear Material” means any source or fissionable or fusionable material as defined in this Convention.
2.15. “Exemption Quantities” mean quantities of nuclear material not prohibited under the provisions of this Act [and preventive controls].
2.16. “Fissionable Material” means any isotope which may undergo either spontaneous fission or fission induced by neutrons of any energy, as well as any compound or mixture including such isotopes.
2.17. “Fusionable Material” means any isotope capable of undergoing fusion with the same kind of nuclide or with any other nuclide by applying sufficient conditions (pressure, temperature and inclusion time) with technical means.
2.18. “Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)” means uranium in which the naturally occurring U-235 isotope (0.7% in natural uranium) is increased to 20% U-235 or above.
2.19. “Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)” means uranium enriched in the isotopic content of
U-235 but to less than 20% of the total mass.
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2.20. “Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX fuel)” means nuclear reactor fuel composed of plutonium
and uranium oxides.
2.21. [“Other Special Nuclear Material” means special nuclear material other than plutonium and uranium enriched to 20% or more U-235 or U-233.]
2.22. “Proscribed fissionable material” means any fissionable material that can be used for
the manufacture of nuclear weapons without transmutation, chemical reprocessing or
further enrichment, and includes any isotopic mixture of separated and unirradiated plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotoptes 235 to 20% or more, uranium-233.
2.23. “Proscribed fusionable material” means any fusionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons without transmutation, redoxation or further enrichment.
2.24. “Proscribed nuclear material” means any proscribed fissionable or any proscribed fusionable material.
2.25. “Significant quantity” means the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of
which, taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
2.26. “Source Material” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope U-235, thorium, lithium beyond naturally occurring concentration[10], deuterium, helium-3 [11], or any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound or concentrate.
2.27. “Special Fissionable Material” means fissionable material that can be used for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons.
2.28. “Special Fusionable Material” means any fusionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and includes deuterium, tritium, helium-3, and lithium-6.
2.29. “Special Nuclear Material” means any special fissionable or any special fusionable material.
Nuclear Facilities (Section “II.E.” A/62/650)
2.30. “Nuclear Facility” means any facility for the research, testing, production, extraction, enrichment, processing, reprocessing, or storage of nuclear material; any facility for the production of nuclear energy; any facility for the research, development, testing, production, storage, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, modification, deployment, or delivery of nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapon components; or any facility deemed
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a nuclear facility by the Technical Secretariat. The term “Nuclear Facility” includes [but is not limited to] the following:
2.31. “Command, Control or Communication Facility”, means [any facility designed or used for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes.]
2.32. “Deployment Site” means the location where a nuclear weapon is or has been deployed, or a location which is equipped for the deployment of nuclear weapons.
2.33. “Nuclear Enrichment Facility” means a facility capable of increasing the ratio of the
isotope uranium-235 in natural uranium.
2.34. “Nuclear Material Storage Facility” means a facility for the interim or long-term storage of nuclear material.
2.35. “Nuclear Reactor” means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained or in which a controlled fission chain is maintained partly by an external source of neutrons.[12]
2.36. “Nuclear Reprocessing Facility” means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear material and fission products in whole or in part, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and analytical sections.
2.37. “Nuclear Weapons Dismantling Facility” means any facility for disassembly or dismantling of nuclear weapons or for rendering them permanently inoperable.
2.38. “Nuclear Weapons Facility” means any facility for the design, research, development[13], testing, production, storage, assembly, maintenance, modification, deployment, delivery, command, or control of nuclear weapons or Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 nuclear weapon components.[14]
2.39. “Nuclear Weapons Production Facility” means any nuclear facility which produces materials which have been or may be used for military purposes, including such a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for
separating the isotopes of nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear
material, a plant for the construction or assembly of nuclear weapon components, or a facility or plant of such other type as may be deemed a Nuclear Weapons Production
Facility by the Technical Secretariat. (Parenthetical qualification dropped since A/C.1/52/7.)
2.40. “Nuclear Weapons Research Facility” means any facility in which nuclear weapons
research, development, testing or computer simulation is conducted.
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2.41. “Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility” means a facility for the storage of nuclear weapons but does not include such a facility located on a deployment site.
2.42. “Nuclear Weapons Testing Facility” means a facility or prepared site for conducting nuclear weapons testing.
(Two other definitions dropped since A/C.1/52/7.: “Other Nuclear Facility”, and “Principal Nuclear Facility)
Nuclear Activities (Part “II.F.” A/62/650)
2.43. “Nuclear Activity” means:
2.43.1. Any construction or use of a nuclear reactor or component parts thereof;
2.43.2. Any production, use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon;
2.43.3.. Any research, development or testing of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons;
2.43.4.. Any production, separation, treatment or handling of nuclear material;
2.43.5.. Any dismantling, disabling or destruction of nuclear weapons;
2.43.6. Any decommissioning of nuclear reactors and power plants;
2.43.7. Any application of radiation and isotopes in food, agriculture, medicine, engineering, geology or other industrial processes; or
2.43.8. Any other activity listed below or deemed a nuclear activity by the Agency.
2.44. “Convert” means modify to a use not prohibited under this Convention.
2.45. “De-alert” means reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons by eliminating launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack alert readiness postures, e.g., by removing key trigger mechanisms, decoupling warheads from nuclear weapons delivery vehicles or other means.[15]
2.46. “Deployment of a nuclear weapon” means prepare or maintain a nuclear weapon for possible use by any of the following:
2.46.1. placing it on, in or near a delivery system;
2.46.2.. moving it to or maintaining it at a location suitable for delivery to a target.
2.47. Reserved
2.48. “Disable” means:
2.48.1. with regard to a nuclear weapon, to render the weapon unable to be detonated by such means as disengaging or removing the arming fuse and firing mechanisms;
2.48.2. with regard to a plutonium pit[16], to render the pit[17] unable to be used in a nuclear weapon[18], e.g., by disfiguring, quenching, squeezing,[19] dilution, mixing with highly radioactive waste, immobilization and disposition,[20] transmutation or other means[21];
2.48.3. with regard to command and control systems for nuclear weapons, to render such
systems incapable of initiating or directing the launch of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
2.48.4. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to render such vehicle unable to launch a nuclear weapon including such means as removing essential components and removing the delivery vehicle from the launch facilities.
2.49. “Disassemble” or “Dismantle” means:
2.49.1. with regard to nuclear weapons, to take apart the warhead and remove the subassemblies, components, and individual parts;
2.49.2. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to separate the essential component parts, such as warheads, propulsion and guidance units.
2.50. “Immobilization” means the process of putting nuclear material into non-weapons usable form without irradiation, e.g., by mixing with highly radioactive isotopes and encasing into a matrix of another material in order to render separation of the nuclear material from the matrix technically difficult. Immobilization includes vitrification and encasing nuclear material in ceramic.[22]
2.51. “Nuclear Disarmament Research” means research intended to further the purposes of this Convention.[23]
2.52. “Nuclear Weapons Research” means experimental or theoretical work undertaken
principally to acquire new knowledge going beyond publicly available information of phenomena and observable facts directed toward understanding, development, improvement, testing, production, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons. (a final clause was dropped since A/C.1/52/7.)[24]
2.53. “Nuclear Weapons Testing” means nuclear explosions, computer simulations, hydrodynamic tests, hydronuclear tests designed to simulate behavior of nuclear
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materials, nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons or their components, under nuclear explosive conditions, and subcritical testing using nuclear materials. (Adjusted since A/C.1/52/7.)[25]
2.54. “Reprocessing” means the separation of irradiated nuclear material and fission products in whole or in part. (Adjusted since A/C.1/52/7.)[26]
2.55. “Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons” means any act, whether physical or verbal, including the maintenance of a previously stated policy that creates or is intended to create a perception that a nuclear weapon may or will be used. (Adjusted since A/C.1/52/7.)
2.56. “Uranium Enrichment” means the process of increasing the percentage of U-235 isotopes so that the uranium can be used as reactor fuel or in nuclear weapons. (Adjusted since A/C.1/52/7.)
2.57.1. “Use of Nuclear Weapons” means any illegal activity involving the possession or control of a nuclear weapon. (Adjusted since A/C.1/52/7.)
2.57.2. “Detonation of a Nuclear Weapon” means the explosion of the nuclear material of a nuclear weapon. Detonation typically involves the attainment of a critical mass initiating an uncontrolled nuclear reaction. However, the Agency and the World Court may also find explosions of nuclear material from a sub-critical mass, or highly controlled nuclear reactions of a nuclear weapon to also be detonation.
Verification (Section “II.G.” A/62/650)
2.58. “Verification” means a comprehensive system for ensuring the compliance with and implementation of this Act and other world legislation. Verification measures include obtaining[27], providing, and assuring the accuracy[28] of information on nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including information in archives, data bases, and transportation systems,[29] through declarations, monitoring, agreements on sharing information[30], consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, confidence-building measures, reporting and protection, preventive controls[31], and any other measures deemed necessary by the Agency.
2.59. “Abuse of the Right of Verification” means obtaining information, or attempting to obtain information, through verification activities, for purposes not relating to the verification or implementation of and compliance with world legislation.
2.60. “Confidence-Building Measures” means voluntary measures by States Parties to supply information, additional to that required, to the Technical Secretariat or to other States Parties in order to develop greater confidence in compliance with world law. These could include bilateral or multilateral agreements on monitoring and information sharing between States Parties.
2.61.1. “Confidential information regarding legitimate national or international security concerns” include the following: numbers, qualifications and positions of military troops not equipped with illegal weapons; Number and type of legal weapons in possession suitable for law enforcement purposes; number and type of munitions suitable for law enforcement purposes; and schedules of movement for any of the above.[32]
2.61.2. “Legitimate trade secret” means a trade secret that is not violation of world legislation.[33]
2.62. “Reconstruction” means undertaking good faith scientifically sound[34] efforts to produce or reproduce data that is not readily available regarding past production of nuclear material. Reconstruction measures include gathering and reviewing past data records, analyzing production capacity and estimating the range of quantity of nuclear material
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produced, and interviewing individuals with knowledge of the operation of a nuclear facility under review.
2.63. “Preventive[35] Controls” mean provisions adopted by the Agency to ensure that nuclear material and nuclear facilities are not used for any military or other purpose prohibited under world law.
2.63.1. The goals of preventive controls include:
2.63.1.1. Timely detection of diversion of nuclear material to allow a response before the material can be fabricated into a nuclear weapon;
2.63.1.2. Deterring clandestine activities through the possibility of detection;
2.63.1.3. Prevention of diversion through physical safety procedures and transfer of national access to dual-access.
2.63.2. Preventive controls encompass safeguards of the IAEA (including all provisions of the 93+2 Programme), EURATOM, ABACC or other bodies;
agreements among States; and agreements between States and the Agency.
2.63.3. Preventive controls apply to all nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The degree of restrictiveness, accountability and accessibility vary according to the risks posed by these weapons, materials or facilities to the purposes of this Act. Preventive controls may include:
2.63.3.1. Accountancy and surveillance of nuclear material in any form;
2.63.3.2. Containment of special nuclear material in any form;
2.63.3.3. Guidelines for the transport, treatment, handling, storage and
disposition of nuclear material;
2.63.3.4. Environmental guidelines;
2.63.3.5. World Disarmament Agency agreements for all nuclear weapons facilities and nuclear storage facilities for proscribed nuclear material.[36]
2.64. “Technical Means” means the independent gathering or analysis of information which may have relevance to verification of the Act, without physically accessing the territory being inspected.[37]
2.65. “National Technical Means” (NTM) comprise nationally-owned and –operated technologies and techniques used to monitor the activities of other states, including
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their compliance with treaty obligations. [NTM include satellites, aircraft, remote monitoring, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and open source information.][38]
2.66. “Open Skies” means a regime for the conduct of observation flights by States Parties over the territories of other States Parties.[39]
Delivery Vehicles (Section“II.H.” A/62/650)
2.67. “Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon delivery vehicle which has been constructed, developed, flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle.
2.68. “Ballistic Missile” means a missile that
2.68.1. consists of single or multiple stage(s) whose sole means of propulsion is an internal
rocket engine that is functional over all or a portion of the flight path;
2.68.2. follows a ballistic trajectory over the remaining unpowered portion of a flight path; and
c. is devoid of active aerodynamic surfaces.
2.69. “Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM)” means a ballistic missile that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this
aircraft.
2.70. “Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic
missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
2.71. “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)” means a land-based ballistic missile with a
range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.
2.72. “Submarine [Sea] Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)” means a ballistic missile
designed to be launched from a submarine or other naval vessel.
2.73. “Cruise Missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled weapon delivery vehicle that
sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. Cruise Missiles include:
2.73.1. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM);
2.73.2. Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM);
2.73.3. Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).
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2.74. “Intermediate-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile having a range
capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers.
2.75. “Shorter-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers.
2.76. “Bomber” means an airplane which was initially constructed or later converted to be
equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.
2.77. “Heavy Bomber” means a bomber which satisfies either of the following criteria:
2.77.1. its range is greater than 8,000 kilometers; or
2.77.2. it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
2.78. “Nuclear-Capable” in relation to delivery vehicles means able to deliver and activate a nuclear weapon.
2.79. “Nuclear-Capable Missile” means a missile able to deliver any payload over 300
kilometers.
2.80. “Nuclear-Capable Submarines” includes ballistic missile submarines, cruise missile
submarines and attack submarines capable of delivery of nuclear weapons.
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3. Declarations
Nuclear Weapons (Section “III.A.” A/62/650)
Each State Party to the Earth Constitution shall submit to the Registry, not later than [30] days after this Act enters into force for the State, the following declarations, in which the State shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
3.01. Declare whether the State owns or possesses or has owned or possessed any nuclear weapons, or whether there are any nuclear weapons located in any place under the State’s jurisdiction or control.
3.02. Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of nuclear weapons the State owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under the State’s jurisdiction or control.
3.03. Report any nuclear weapons on the State’s territory that are owned or possessed by another State or under the jurisdiction or control of another State, whether or not that State is a Party to the Earth Constitution.
3.04. Declare whether the State has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of any nuclear weapons.
3.05. Provide the State’s general plan for dismantling of nuclear weapons that the State owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under the State’s jurisdiction or control.
Nuclear Material (Section “III.B.” A/62/650)
Each State Party to the Earth Constitution shall submit to the Registry the following declarations, in which the State shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
3.06. Not later than [60] days after this Act enters into force for a State, declare an inventory of all special nuclear material the State owns or possesses or that is located within the State’s jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.
3.07. Not later than [90] days after this Act enters into force for a State, declare an inventory of all other nuclear material the State owns or possesses or that is located within the State’s jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.
3.08. Not later than [120] days after this Act enters into force for a State, submit a report on the availability of data with respect to nuclear material produced in the past, including estimates regarding missing data and extent of uncertainty, and the State’s plans for the reconstruction of the data.
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Nuclear Facilities (Section “III.C.” A/62/650)
Each State Party to the Earth Constitution shall submit to the Registry, not later than [180] days after this Act enters into force for the State, the following declarations, in which the State shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
3.09. With respect to nuclear weapons facilities:
3.09.1. Declare whether the State has or has had any nuclear weapons facility under State ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place under the State’s jurisdiction or control at any time.
3.09.2. Declare any nuclear weapons facility the State has or has had under State ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place under State jurisdiction or control at any time.
3.09.3. Declare any nuclear weapons facility on State territory that another State has or has had under the other State’s ownership or possession and that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State at any time.
3.09.4. Declare the precise location and production and storage capacities of any facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.
3.09.5. Declare whether the State has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of nuclear weapons, and provide a detailed account thereof.
3.09.6. Specify actions to be taken for the closure of any facility reported under subparagraphs
a, b, or c above.
3.09.7. Provide the State’s general plan for conversion of any facility reported under subparagraphs 3.09.1, 3.09.2, or 3.09.3 into a nuclear weapons dismantling facility.
3.10. With respect to other nuclear facilities, declare the precise location, nature and scope of activities of any nuclear facility under the State’s ownership or possession, or located in any place under the State’s jurisdiction or control. Such declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites as well as any other facility, site, or installation in which nuclear activities of any kind have been or are carried out, or which are suitable for carrying out nuclear activities.
Delivery Vehicles (Section “III.D.” A/62/650)
Each State Party to the Earth Constitution shall submit to the Registry, not later than [210] days after this Act enters into force for the State, the following declarations, in which the State shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Verification Annex:
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3.11. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, including all those in production, storage or under repair.
3.12. Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable submarines, naval crafts, and aircraft, including all those in production, storage or under repair.
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4. Phases for Implementation
General Requirements (Section “IV.A.” A/62/650)
4.01. Each phase indicates the deadline for completion of specific implementation activity. Any phase can begin at any time, and does not require the completion of previous phases before initiation.
4.02. The World Disarmament Agency and States Parties shall conduct implementation activities in accordance with the Verification Annex.
Extension of Deadlines (Section “IV.B.” A/62/650)
4.03. If a State Party is unable to complete any of the State’s obligations under Phase One within the deadline, the State may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension. A State shall make any request at least [four] months prior to the deadline, and no extension may exceed [six] months.
4.04. If a State Party is unable to complete any obligations under Phase Two within the deadline, the State may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension. A State shall make any extension request at least [six] months prior to the deadline, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].
4.05. If a State Party is unable to complete any obligations under Phases Three, Four, or Five within the deadlines, the State may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline. A State shall make any extension request at least [one] year[s] prior to the deadline for that phase, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].
Reciprocity in Extensions (Section “IV.C.” A/62/650)
4.06. If any State Party makes a request for an extension of any deadline, any other State Party may request a similar extension within [one month] of the original State’s request.
Phases (Section “IV.D.” A/62/650)
4.07. Phase One. Not later than [one year] after entry into force of this Act:
4.07.01. All States Parties shall be in compliance with the requirements of Article III.
{Declarations}.
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4.07.02. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have completed removal of targeting coordinates and navigational information for all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
4.07.03. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have completed the disabling and de-alerting of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
4.07.04. All States Parties shall have ceased activities listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities.
4.07.05. All States Parties shall have ceased production of nuclear weapon components and equipment listed in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Weapons Components and Equipment.
4.07.06. All States Parties shall have designated for decommissioning and closure or for conversion of all nuclear weapons testing facilities, nuclear weapons research facilities and nuclear weapons production facilities.
4.07.07. All States Parties shall have ceased production of proscribed nuclear material.
4.07.08. [Funding for] nuclear weapons research not consistent with the purposes and obligations of this Act shall have ceased.
4.07.09. States Parties shall have submitted to the Agency plans for the implementation of all obligations under this Act.
4.07.10. The World Attorneys General and the Enforcement System shall prosecute cases of individual or corporate non-compliance.
4.08. Phase Two. Not later than [two] years after entry into force of this Act:
4.08.1. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have completed removal of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles from deployment sites.
4.08.2. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have completed removal of all warheads from their delivery vehicles and either placed into nuclear weapons storage facilities or dismantled.
4.08.3. The Conference of the World Disarmament Agency shall propose legislative guidelines for preventive controls for all nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
4.08.4. The Conference of the World Disarmament Agency shall propose legislative guidelines for amendment of world federal enforcement procedures and penal provisions for individual or corporate violation of this Act and other world legislation regarding military disarmament.
4.08.5. The World Attorneys General and the Enforcement System shall prosecute cases of individual or corporate non-compliance.
4.09. Phase Three. Not later than [five] years after entry into force of this Act:
4.09.1. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have dismantled all nuclear weapons that had been under State Party control.
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4.09.2.1. (Reserved. No nuclear stockpile exceptions for any countries, whether or not Earth Federation states parties.).
4.09.2.2. (Reserved. No nuclear stockpile exceptions for any countries, whether or not Earth Federation states parties.).
4.09.3. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have dismantled all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles or converted the vehicles for purposes not prohibited under this Act.
4.09.4. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have designated all nuclear weapons facilities for decommissioning and closure or for conversion.
4.10. Phase Four. Not later than [10] years after entry into force of this Act:
4.10.1.. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have dismantled all nuclear weapons that had been under State Party control.:
4.10.2. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall close or convert to low enriched uranium use all reactors using highly enriched uranium .
4.10.3. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall close or convert [all reactors using plutonium as fuel to reactors that do not use any special nuclear material.]
4.10.4. The World Disarmament Agency shall hold all special nuclear material in any form under strict, effective and exclusive preventive controls.
4.10.5. The World Attorneys General and the Enforcement System shall prosecute cases of individual or corporate non-compliance.
4.11. Phase Five. Not later than [15] years after entry into force of this Act:
4.11.1. All States Parties, under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency, shall have dismantled all nuclear weapons that had been under State Party control.
4.11.2. The World Parliament will review [the powers and functions of the Agency and will adjust the powers and functions to preserve the Agency’s role in carrying out the objectives of this Act.]
4.11.3. The World Attorneys General and the Enforcement System shall prosecute cases of individual or corporate non-compliance.
Special Provision (Section “IV.E.” A/62/650)
4.12. Reserved.[40]
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4.13. Reserved.
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5. Verification
Elements of Verification Regime (Section “V.A.” A/62/650)
In order to verify compliance with this Act and other world law, this Act together with ratification of the Earth Constitution establishes a verification regime consisting of the following elements:
5.01. Agreements on sharing data and verification activities among States, UN organs and[41] with existing agencies,
5.02. A Registry,
5.03. A World Monitoring System,
5.04. Reporting of information gathered by National Technical Means,
5.05. Open Skies[42],
5.06. Preventive controls[43],
5.07. Consultation and clarification,
5.08. On-site inspections, including challenge inspections,
5.09. Confidence-building measures, including additional voluntary measures[44],
5.10. Citizen and non-governmental[45] reporting reporting and protection,
5.11. Any other measures deemed necessary by the World Disarmament Agency.
Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Verification (Section “V.B.” A/62/650)
5.12. All obligations of States Parties and persons as defined, inter alia, in Article 1 {General Obligations}, Article 3 {Declarations} and Article 4, Section 4. {Phases} are subject to verification in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Act and the Verification Annex.
Rights and Obligations of States Parties with Respect to Verification (Section “V.C.” A/62/650)
5.13. The World Disarmament Agency shall base verification activities on objective information, shall limit verification to the subject matter of world legislation and world law regarding military disarmament, and shall implement verification on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of the people of the Earth Federation and implement in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the
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effective and timely accomplishment of the objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the power of verification.
5.14. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Act to cooperate with the Agency through the National Authority established pursuant to Article 6 {National Implementation Measures} of this Act, with other States Parties and with other agencies as stipulated in this Act, and in separate agreements to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Act by, inter alia:
5.14.1. Establishing the necessary facilities, or providing necessary modifications to existing facilities, to participate in these verification measures, and establishing the necessary communication;
5.14.2. Providing all relevant data obtained by technical means and by national systems that
are part of the World Monitoring System as agreed among States in World Parliament and the Conference;
5.14.3. Participating, as necessary, in a consultation and clarification process;
5.14.4. Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections;
5.14.5. Participating in confidence-building measures; and
5.14.6. To the extent possible, mundializing elements of its National Technical Means and incorporating them into the World Monitoring System.
5.15. Each State Party has the power to take measures not contrary to the provisions of world law to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Act.
5.16. Subject to Article paragraph 5.15, the Agency shall make information obtained by the Agency through the verification regime established by this Act available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Act.
5.17. The World Attorneys General and the World Court must not interpret provisions of this Act to restrict the international exchange of data for scientific purposes not prohibited by world legislation.
5.18. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime and in the examination of additional monitoring technologies. World Parliament will deliberate amendments to this Act and other world legislation. The Conference may recommend amendments to this Act, change the Annexes or, where appropriate, change the operational manuals of the Technical Secretariat.
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Confidence-Building Measures (Section “V.D.” A/62/650)
5.19. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in implementing various measures additional to those explicitly required under world legislation to:
5.19.1. Develop greater confidence regarding compliance with the obligations under this Act, and
5.19.2. Assist in the compilation of detailed information by the World Monitoring
System.
Relation to Other Verification Arrangements
(Section “V.E.” A/62/650)
5.20. The Technical Secretariat may enter into cooperative verification arrangements in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement} para. 3 and the provisions of Articles 18.1 & 18.2., (XVIII. Section A. A/62/650) {Relation to Other International Agreements} para. 2.
5.21. Reserved.[46]
5.22. Reserved.[47]
5.23. Reserved.[48]
Implementation (Section “V.F.” A/62/650)
5.24. Prior to entry into force of this Act, nothing shall preclude any signatory State from implementing, individually or in agreement with other States, the verification measures of this Act which are applicable to the respective States. Measures may include public declarations as detailed in Article 3 {Declarations}, negotiations with other States for the purposes of verifying bilateral or multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, and the verification of plans
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for the dismantling of nuclear weapons, disposition of special nuclear material, and dismantling
or conversion of nuclear weapons facilities or nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
5.25. Verification measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 5.23 may include the formation of a provisional authority for the purpose of overseeing verification activities, including assistance in the development of national implementation plans pursuant to Article 6 {National Implementation Measures} of this Act.
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6. National Implementation Measures
Legislative Implementation (Section “VI.A.” A/62/650)
6.01. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the State’s constitutional processes, adopt the necessary legislative measures to implement obligations under this Act. In particular, States Parties shall:
6.01.1. Extend the State’s law enforcement legislation to provide, in accordance with Article paragraphs 7.1 through 7.3. (Article VII, Section A. A/62/650) for cooperation with world federal enforcement against persons who commit crimes as defined in Article paragraph 1.2 (Article I, Section B. A/62/650) of this Act.
6.01.2. Provide all necessary protection for persons who report violations of this Act, in accordance with Article paragraphs 7.6 through 7.13. (Article VII, Section C. A/62/650).
6.02. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties in affording legal assistance toward fulfilling the obligations under paragraph 1.
6.03. Each State Party, in the implementation of obligations under world law, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties, world federal enforcement and world federal judiciary in this regard.
Relations Between the State Party and the Agency (Section “VI.B.” A/62/650)
6.04. In order to fulfill its obligations under world law, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Agency and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Agency of National Authority at the time that this Act enters into force for the State. The responsibilities of the National Authority include:
6.04.1. The preparations and submission of declarations in the registry;
6.04.2. The enactment of new legislation or the revision of existing legislation to facilitate the cooperative world federal enforcement of world law;
6.04.3. Preparations for receiving inspections, including, inter alia, verifying the list of inspectors, waiving visas for inspectors, providing aircraft clearances, and designating points of entry and exit.
6.05. Each State Party shall inform the Agency of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Act with respect to world legislation and military disarmament generally.
6.06. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency in the exercise of all the State’s functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat. This includes cooperation in carrying out any investigation
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which the Agency might initiate, and to provide or support assistance with investigations of non-complying State Parties and with Parties exposed to danger as a result of violation of this Act.
6.07. Each State Party shall disseminate information regarding the requirements of this Act and shall ensure the inclusion of this information in the training of relevant personnel regarding obligations under this Act.
6.08. Each State Party shall transmit relevant information gathered by the State’s National Technical Means to the World Monitoring System.
Confidentiality (Section “VI.C.” A/62/650)
6.09. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that the State receives in confidence from the Agency. Information subject to confidentiality includes data used for purposes not prohibited under world legislation and state and military technology for dual use vehicles, components and computers.
Relation to implementation measures assumed or required under other arrangements
(Section “VI.D.” A/62/650)
6.10. Reserved.
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7. Rights and Obligations of Persons
Criminal Procedure (Section “VII.A.” A/62/650)
7.01. The Enforcement System and World Court System shall respond to accusation of any person committing a crime under world legislation within the territory of a State Party of which the person is a citizen or resident, by one of the following:.
7.01.1. trial according to the legal process of the Earth Federation in World District Court within that State, or
7.01.2. surrender to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the crime alleged is within the jurisdiction of the ICC and the State concerned is unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.
7.02. If found within another State Party, the Enforcement System and World Court System shall respond to accusation of any person committing a crime under world legislation, by one of the following:
7.02.1. trial according to the legal process of the Earth Federation in World District Court within that State, or
7.02.2. extradition to the State within the jurisdiction of which the crime is alleged to have been committed, for trial according to the legal process of the Earth Federation in World District Court within that State, or
7.02.3. surrender to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the crime alleged is within the jurisdiction of the ICC and the States concerned are unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.
7.03. The Enforcement System and World Court System shall assume any person accused of a crime under this Act to be innocent until proven guilty and have the right to a fair trial and humane treatment, as prescribed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other conventions and agreements which have acquired the status of customary international law, as well as by the Bill of Rights of the Earth Constitution and of world legislation.
Responsibility to Report Violations (Section “VII.B.” A/62/650)
7.04. Persons shall report any violations of this Act to the Agency. This responsibility takes precedence over any obligation not to disclose information that might exist under national security laws or employment contracts.
7.05. The Agency shall hold information received under the preceding paragraph in confidence until formal charges are lodged, except to the extent necessary for investigative purposes.]
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Protection for Persons Providing Information
(Section “VII.C.” A/62/650)
Intra-state protection
7.06. Any person reporting a suspected violation of this Act, either by a person or a State, is guaranteed full civil and political rights including the right to liberty and security of person.
7.07. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that no person reporting a suspected violation of this Act has any rights diminished or privileges withdrawn as a result.
7.08. Any individual who [in good faith] provides the Agency or a National Authority with information regarding a known or suspected violation of this Act cannot be arrested, prosecuted or tried on account thereof.
7.09. It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because the person has opposed any practice as a suspected violation of this Act, reported any violation to the Agency or a National Authority, or testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under this Act or other world legislation (world class 2 misdemeanor).
7.10. Any person against whom a national decision is rendered on account of information furnished by the person to the Agency about a suspected violation of this Act may appeal the decision to the World Ombudsmus upon being notified of the decision.
Inter-State Protection
7.11. Any person reporting a violation of world legislation to the Agency shall be afforded protection by the Agency and by all States Parties, including, in the case of natural persons, the right of asylum in all other States Parties if the person’s safety or security is endangered in the State Party in which they permanently or temporarily reside.
Additional Provisions
7.12. [The Executive Council may decide to award monetary compensation to persons providing important information to the Agency concerning violations of world legislation.]
7.13. Any person who voluntarily admits to the Agency having committed a violation of this Act, prior to the receipt by the Agency of information concerning the violation from another source, might be exempt from criminal prosecution. In deciding whether to grant such exemption, the World Attorneys General shall consider the gravity of the violation involved as well as whether the consequences have not yet occurred or can be reversed as a result of the admission made. However, in cases of alleged damages, the World Attorneys General cannot provide exemptions from civil prosecution through the Civil Bench or the Human Rights Bench.
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8. Agency
General Provisions (Section “VIII.A.” A/62/650)
8.01. The States Parties to the Earth Constitution and the people of Earth confirm the World Disarmament Agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons (hereinafter “the Agency”) to achieve the object and purpose of this Act and world legislation related to military disarmament, to ensure the implementation of the Act’s provisions, including those for international and world verification of compliance with the Act, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
8.02. All States Parties to the Earth Constitution are members of the Agency. There is no further condition, and no authority to deprive a State Party of membership in the Agency.
8.03. The seat of the Headquarters of the Agency shall be __________________.[49]
8.04. The organs of the Agency are the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall oversee the Registry and the World Monitoring System.
8.05. The Agency shall conduct verification activities provided for under world legislation in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of the Act objectives. The Agency shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfill responsibilities under world law. The Agency shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to Agency knowledge in the implementation of world law.
8.06. In undertaking verification activities the Agency shall consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology.
8.07. The Earth Federation or States Parties shall pay the costs of the Agency’s activities in accordance with Article 16 {Financing}. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs.
8.08. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payments of financial contribution to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount of arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from the member for the preceding two full years, and if the member is not seeking the interest-free world federal financing for enabling the required payments,.
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Conference of the States Parties (Section “VIII.B.” A/62/650)
Composition, procedures and decision-making
8.09. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) comprises all members of the Agency. Each member has one representative in the Conference. Alternates and advisors may accompany the representative.
8.10. The first session of the Conference shall convene by the depositary not later than 30 days after the first entry into force of this Act.
8.11. The Conference shall meet in regular annual sessions unless the Conference decides otherwise.
8.12. Special sessions of the Conference shall convene:
8.12.1. When decided by the Conference;
8.12.2. When requested by the Executive Council;
8.12.3. When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members;
8.12.4. In accordance with paragraph 8.22 to undertake reviews of the operation of this Act. Except in cases of 8.12.4 (i.e., 8.22), the special session shall convene not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, unless specified otherwise in the request.
8.13. The Conference shall also convene in the form of an Amendment Conference in accordance with Article 17 of this Act {Amendments}.
8.14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Agency unless the Conference decides otherwise.
8.15. The Conference shall adopt the Conference rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, the Conference shall elect the Conference Chair and such other officers as necessary. Officers shall hold office until a new Chair and other officers are elected at the next regular session.
8.16. A majority of the members of the Agency constitute a quorum for the Conference.
8.17. Each member of the Agency has one vote in the Conference.
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8.18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chair shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Act. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, the Chair shall treat the question as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
Powers and functions
8.19. The Conference is the principal organ of the Agency. The Conference shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of world legislation related to military disarmament, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament raised by a State Party or brought to the Conference’s attention by the Executive Council.
8.20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this world legislation relating to military disarmament, and act in order to promote the object and purpose of the Agency. The Conference shall review compliance with this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament. The Conference shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference may issues guidelines in accordance with this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament to either the Executive Council or the Technical Secretariat in the exercise of respective functions.
8.21. The Conference shall:
8.21.1. Consider and adopt at regular sessions the report, program and budget of the Agency, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;
8.21.2. Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;
8.21.3. Elect the members of the Executive Council;
8.21.4. Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Director-General”);
8.21.5. Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;
8.21.6. Establish such subsidiary organs as the Conference finds necessary for the exercise of Conference functions in accordance with this Act;
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8.21.7. Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Act or other world legislation related to military disarmament and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable the Director-General, in the performance of functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Act, to other world legislation relating to military disarmament, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board composes of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;
8.21.8. Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Act, in accordance with Article 14 {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}.
8.22. The Conference shall, not later than one year after the expiration of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Act, and at such other times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Act. Reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall convene with the same objective.
The Executive Council (Section “VIII.C.” A/62/650)
Composition, procedure and decision-making
8.23. The Executive Council shall consist of _____ members.[50] Each State Party has the power, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council. The Conference elects States[51] members of the Executive Council for a term of four years. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Act, due regard being paid to equitable geographic distribution, to representation by nuclear-capable states and to the interests of all states to be free from the threat of nuclear devastation, the Executive Council composes as follows:
8.23.1. All Nuclear Weapons States Parties; and
8.23.2. Six[52] States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia[53];
8.23.3. Seven[54] States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;
8.23.4. Six[55] States Parties from Eastern Europe;
8.23.5. Seven[56] States Parties from Africa;
8.23.6. Six[57] States Parties from among North America[58] and Western Europe;
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8.23.7. Six States Parties from South East Asia[59], the Pacific and the Far East[60];
8.23.8. Up to _____ additional States Parties that have special interest or expertise in implementing the aims of this Act to be elected if required.[61]
8.23.9. World Attorneys General and Regional World Attorneys are ex-officio members of the Executive Council.[62]
8.24. For the first election of the Executive Council, the Conference shall elect 21 members for a term of two years, and 21 members for a term of four years.
8.25. The Conference may, on Conference motion or upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive Council taking into account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 23.
8.26. The Executive Council shall elaborate Council rules of procedure and submit the rules to the Conference for approval.
8.27. The Executive Council shall elect a Council Chair from among Council members.
8.28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions the Council shall meet as often as necessary for the fulfillment of Council powers and functions.
8.29. Each member of the Executive Council has one vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Act, the Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all Council members. When an issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question is a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
Powers and Functions
8.30. The Executive Council is the executive organ of the Agency. The Executive Council is responsible to the Conference. The Executive Council shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to the Council under this Act, as well as those functions delegated to the Council by the Conference. In so doing, the Council shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation.
8.31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Act and other world legislation. The Executive Council shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at States Parties request.
8.32. The Executive Council shall:
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8.32.1. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft program and budget of the Agency;
8.32.2. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the Agency on the implementation of this Act and other world legislation related to military disarmament, the report on the performance of the Executive Council’s own activities and special reports as the Council deems necessary or which the Conference requests;
8.32.3. Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference including the preparation of the
draft agenda.
8.33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the Conference.
8.34. The Executive Council may:
8.34.1. Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Agency, subject to prior approval by the Conference;
8.34.2. Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties.
8.35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within Executive Council competence affecting this Act and implementation of world legislation relating to military disarmament, including concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and request compliance within a specified time.
8.36. If the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, the Executive Council shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures in accordance with Article 14 {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}:
8.36.1. Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
8.36.2. Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
8.36.3. Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.
8.36.4. The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the Presidium and of the World Attorneys General. Unless directed otherwise by the World Attorneys General or the Presidium, the Executive Council may also inform the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. The Executive Council shall at the same time inform all States Parties of these steps.
The Technical Secretariat (Section “VIII.D.” A/62/650)
8.37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the
performance of functions. The Technical Secretariat shall implement the verification measures provided
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for in this Act. The Technical Secretariat shall implement the other functions entrusted to the Technical Secretariat under this Act as well as those functions delegated to the Technical Secretariat by the Conference and the Executive Council.
8.38. With respect to the verification of and compliance with this Act, the Technical Secretariat shall:
8.38.1. Maintain the Registry and other information databases in accordance with Section F below;
8.38.2. Maintain and coordinate the operation of the World Monitoring System;
8.38.3. Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of
monitoring systems;
8.38.4. Assist the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;
8.38.5. Receive requests for on-site inspections and process them, facilitate the Executive Council consideration of on-site inspection requests, carry out the preparation for, and provide technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and report to the Executive Council;
8.38.6. Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive Council;
8.38.7. Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of the provisions of this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament;
8.38.8. Assist the States Parties through the National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament.
8.39. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of various components of the verification regime, in accordance with the Verification Annex. These manuals do not constitute integral parts of this Act or the Annexes; the Technical Secretariat may change the manuals subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.
8.40. With respect to administrative matters the Technical Secretariat shall:
8.40.1. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft program and budget of the
Agency;
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8.40.2. Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the Agency on the implementation of this Act and other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council requests;
8.40.3. Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary organs;
8.40.4. Address and receive communications on behalf of the Agency to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament;
8.40.5. Upon approval by the Executive Council and the Conference, submit the report of the Agency to the Presidium and to the United Nations Secretary-General.
8.41. The States Parties shall transmit requests and notifications to the Agency through their National Authorities to the Director-General. National Authorities shall use one of the official languages of the United Nations or Esperanto for Requests and notifications. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.
8.42. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of Technical Secretariat functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament that have come to the notice of the Technical Secretariat in the performance of Technical Secretariat verification activities or through confidential or non-governmental sources[63] and that the Technical Secretariat has been unable to resolve or clarify through consultations with the State Party concerned.
8.43. The Technical Secretariat comprises a Director-General, who is the head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and scientific, technical and other personnel as is necessary.
8.44. The Inspectorate is a unit of the Technical Secretariat and acts under the supervision of the Director-General.
8.45. The Conference shall appoint the Director-General upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The appointment of the Director-General is a matter of substance governed by paragraph 8.18.
8.46. The Director-General is responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat.
The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service is the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of the Earth Federation, having undergone a solemn undertaking affirming allegiance to the Earth Constitution shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. The Director-General shall pay due regard to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
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The principle that the staff shall be kept to the optimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat shall guide the recruitment.
8.47. The Director-General is responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 8.21.7. The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties and non-governmental sources, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The Director-General shall appoint members of the Board on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties and non-governmental sources may submit lists of experts to the Director-General. The Director –General may call upon the Scientific Advisory Board to review nuclear or other research and determine whether the research is of a nature prohibited under world legislation or of a nature that might contribute to verification of nuclear disarmament.
8.48. In the performance of duties, the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government below the jurisdiction of the Earth Federation, nor from any other source external to the Earth Federation. Staff shall refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as world federal officers responsible to the Conference, to the Executive Council to the Earth Federation and to the people of Earth.
8.49. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively world federal character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence staff in the discharge of responsibilities. Attempt to suborn any personnel or officer of the Agency is unlawful (world class 3 felony).
Privileges and Immunities (Section “VIII.E.” A/62/650)
8.50. The Agency enjoys on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party legal capacity and privileges and immunities as are appropriate for the exercise of Agency functions.
8.51. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Agency enjoy privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of functions in connection with the Agency.
8.52. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article are further defined in World Legislative Act #37, World Federal Privileges and Immunities, Articles 13 and 14.
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8.53. Special privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities are those set forth in the Verification Annex.
Registry and Other Databases (Section “VIII.F.” A/62/650)
8.54. The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a Registry of the following:
8.54.1. All nuclear weapons;
8.54.2. All nuclear material;
8.54.3. All nuclear facilities;
8.54.4. All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
8.54.5. Any other facilities or materials as determined by the Technical Secretariat.
8.55. The Technical Secretariat shall obtain information from the following sources:
8.55.01. Declarations by States in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 {Declarations};
8.55.02. Reports by States on progress in implementing obligations under this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament;
8.55.03. The World Monitoring System;
8.55.04. National Technical Means;
8.55.05. Systematic inspections;
8.55.06. Challenge inspections;
8.55.07. Other organizations with which the Agency has concluded agreements on sharing information in accordance with Articles 18.1 & 8.2., (XVIII. Section A. A/62/650) {Relation to Other International Agreements};
8.55.08. Other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that collect and submit information;
8.55.09. Publicly available sources;
8.55.10. Any other sources which the Technical Secretariat deems appropriate.
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8.56. The Technical Secretariat shall make available to the Registry information obtained from the above sources with the exception of information which the Technical Secretariat shall keep confidential because of legitimate national and international security concerns or legitimate trade secret concerns.
8.57. The Technical Secretariat shall make available information in the Registry to all States parties and to the public according to criteria established by separate agreements [among States] in the case of nationally owned monitoring facilities, or according to the Executive Council, in the case of Agency owned facilities.[64]
World Monitoring System (Section “VIII.G.” A/62/650)
8.58. The World Monitoring System comprises facilities and systems for monitoring by satellite, on-site sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling, respective means of communication, aircraft and other systems developed as deemed necessary by the Agency.
8.59. The World Monitoring System is under the authority of the Technical Secretariat.
8.60. The States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for monitoring facilities of the World Monitoring System may own and operate the facilities except for those systems or facilities which are owned or operated by another agency or by the United Nations, or constructed or acquired by the Agency in accordance with Article paragraph 8.63.
8.61. The Technical Secretariat shall acquire equipment necessary for collating and analyzing data provided by the World Monitoring System.
8.62. Any State Party may, upon agreement with the Technical Secretariat, give a monitoring facility to the Agency.
8.63. The Technical Secretariat may, upon agreement of the Conference and in accordance with Conference funding guidelines, construct or otherwise acquire a monitoring system or facility if the Technical Secretariat determines that the facility or system is necessary for verification of obligations of States under this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament.
8.64. Each State has the power to participate in the international and world exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the Registry.
8.65. The Agency shall conclude agreements with other agencies or organizations using world monitoring systems relating to the sharing of information obtained through systems relevant to the verification of this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament in accordance with Articles 18.1 & 18.2., (XVIII. Section A. A/62/650) {Relation to Other International Agreements}.
8.66. Data obtained by the World Monitoring System not directly relevant to verification of this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament is confidential, except where information is relevant to the verification of another
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international agreement [and there is an agreement on sharing information between the Agency and the organization responsible for implementation of that agreement], provided the other agreement is not in conflict with world legislation and the Earth Federation.
8.67. The Technical Secretariat shall first analyze, process and verify data obtained from the World Monitoring System before compiling the information as part of the Registry, in accordance with the provisions of Article paragraph 8.57.
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9. Nuclear Weapons
General Requirements (Section “IX.A.” A/62/650)
9.1. Under supervision of the Agency, and in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article 3 {Declarations}, Article 4 {Phases for Implementation}, the Verification Annex, and the provisions set forth in Article provision 9.2.2. (IX.B.2. A/62/650), States Parties shall do the following: with all nuclear weapons [with corresponding delivery vehicles] : 1. take off alert status; 2. disable; 3. remove from deployment; 4. declare; and 5. dismantle.
Procedures for Disabling and Dismantling Nuclear Weapons (Section “IX.B.” A/62/650)
9.2. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall take the following measures with respect to all nuclear weapons that the State owns or possesses or that have been under State jurisdiction or control:
9.2.1. Each State Party shall apply unique bar-code to all warheads, tagging each warhead for identification using secure visual tags, and register all warheads.
9.2.2. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall disable and dismantle all nuclear weapons or disable and move nuclear weapons to nuclear weapons storage facilities subject to Agency world preventive[65] controls. No exclusive[66] national access to the repositories is allowed. The Agency may remove nuclear weapons from the nuclear weapons storage facilities only for dismantling.
9.2.3. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall quench or otherwise deform and place core elements[67] from newly dismantled warheads in storage under Agency world preventive[68] controls until final disposal of the proscribed[69] nuclear material, in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article X[70] {Nuclear Material}.
Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons (Section “IX.C.” A/62/650)
9.3. All nuclear [weapons][71] facilities and deployment sites are subject to verification, including challenge inspections at any time and non-destructive detection of hidden warheads, to ensure compliance with obligations under this Act not to develop, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons. Further definition and penalizations for violation of this provision are in World Legislative Act #1.
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10. Nuclear Material
Reconstruction and Documentation
(Section “X.A.” A/62/650)
10.1. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall document and declare all military and civilian nuclear material according to the guidelines and standards set forth in Article 3 {Declarations} and the Verification Annex.
10.2. Special Nuclear Material
10.2.1. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall reconstruct, to the extent possible, records of production and use of special nuclear material produced in the past, through analysis of past records, measures of transparency including national legislation aimed at disclosure of information, interviews, and any other appropriate means.
10.2.2. All special nuclear material storage sites and related nuclear facilities usable for production of special nuclear material are subject to preventive[72] controls, including inventory verification as set forth in the Verification Annex.
Control of Special Nuclear Material (Section “X.B.” A/62/650)
10.3. Production and use of proscribed[73] nuclear material is prohibited. Existing inventories of special nuclear material are subject to preventive controls and storage and disposal in accordance with the guidelines and standards set forth below and in separate verification agreements.
10.4. All treatment of nuclear material that increases material quality to the level of proscribed nuclear material or increases the accessibility of proscribed nuclear material is prohibited, including, inter alia, separation of plutonium from spent fuel, enrichment of uranium in U-235 beyond unavoidable civilian requirements or beyond 20%, or extraction of tritium from heavy water, with the exception of exemption quantities. (World class 1 felony. Unlawful production of nuclear material is further defined and penalized under World Legislative Act 33, Article 2.)
10.5. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall place all existing stocks of special nuclear material under preventive[74] controls until a safe method of final disposal is found and approved by the Agency. All handling of proscribed[75] nuclear material except for such handling as necessary for this Act and other world legislation relating to military disarmament is prohibited. (Unnecessary handling of proscribed nuclear material. World class 1 misdemeanor)
10.6. [Burning of special fissionable material is prohibited unless the net amount of fissionable material resulting from such burning is reduced.] If burning, the burning agency shall provide scrubbers to scrub the resulting gases so that neither radiological nor chemically toxic particles or gases release into the environment. (Unlawful burning – World class 1 felony)
10.7. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party may convert facilities for the production, research and testing of special nuclear material to uses consistent with the purposes and obligations of this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament. Conversion of facilities may include research and development for methods of demilitarization and disposal of proscribed nuclear material, including immobilization and final disposition of plutonium.[76]
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Licensing Requirements (Section “X.C.” A/62/650)
10.8. Reserved.
Relation to other International Agreements
(Section “X.D.” A/62/650)
10.9. Reserved.
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11. Nuclear Facilities
Nuclear Weapons Facilities (Section “XI.A.” A/62/650)
11.01. All nuclear weapons production facilities shall cease operations prohibited under this Act and shall close or convert to purposes not prohibited under this Act and world legislation.
11.02. All nuclear weapons testing facilities shall cease operations and shall permanently close [or convert to purposes not prohibited under this Act and world legislation].
11.03. All nuclear weapons research facilities shall close or convert to research in accordance with paragraph 11.4.
11.04. Funding of[77] research for designing, modernizing, constructing, modifying or maintaining reliability of nuclear weapons is unlawful (World class 7 felony). Funding of[78] research for developing knowledge in the physics of nuclear explosions is unlawful. (World class 7 felony. Unlawful funding is further defined and penalized in World Legislative Act #13, Article 2.3.) [79]
Funding of[80] research in safety mechanisms for existing nuclear weapons is permitted only until all nuclear weapons are dismantled. Funding of[81] research for safe dismantling and destroying of nuclear weapons and for safe disposal of special nuclear material is permitted.
11.05. [All nuclear reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and shall permanently close.]
11.06. All nuclear facilities are subject to preventive controls.
11.07. All plans for the disabling, dismantling, or conversion of nuclear weapons [production, research and testing facilities and principal nuclear] facilities, submitted in accordance with Article 4 {Phases for Implementation}, shall include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees of the facilities in positions of employment consistent with the former employees’ experience and expertise and with the object and purpose of this Act and other world legislation. Positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility, employment for the disabling and dismantling of a nuclear facility, employment for the disabling or dismantling of nuclear weapons or disposition of special nuclear material, or employment within the Agency for the purposes of verification.
Command, Control, and Communications
Facilities and Deployment Sites (Section “XI.B.” A/62/650)
11.08. Each State Party shall make the following changes to nuclear targeting commands and command systems in accordance with Article 4 {Phases for Implementation}:
11.08.1. Rescind alert status on all nuclear weapons;
11.08.2. Remove targeting coordinates from all command and control systems; and
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11.08.3. Remove navigational information for all nuclear armed missiles from the navigational systems.
11.09. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article 4 {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, disable and dismantle any facility, system or sub-system designed or used solely for launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes.
11.10. Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article 4 {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, and in order to prevent use for purposes prohibited under this Act and world legislation, disable, dismantle or convert any facility, system or sub-system which is used for launching, targeting, directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or assisting in any of these purposes, and which is also used for purposes not prohibited under this Act or world legislation.
11.11. Any facility, system or sub-system designed and used for detection of activities prohibited under this Act or other world legislation is permitted.
11.12. All plans for the disabling, dismantling or conversion of command, control, and communications facilities and deployment sites submitted in accordance with Article 4 {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex, shall include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees of such facilities in positions of employment consistent with the employees’ experience and expertise and with the object and purpose of this Act and world legislation. Positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility, employment for the disabling or dismantling of a nuclear facility, employment for the purpose of gathering information, including National Technical Means, and employment within the Agency for inspection or other methods of verification.
Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities (Section “XI.C.” A/62/650)
11.13. All States shall declare the precise location, nature and scope of nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear laboratories, nuclear materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities.
11.14. All plutonium reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and permanently close.
11.15. All States shall conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency [or International Atomic Energy Agency] to verify that nuclear facilities are operated consistent with obligations under this Act and world legislation including obligations under Article 10 (Nuclear Material).[82]
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Activities at nuclear facilities (Section “XI.D.” A/62/650)
11.16. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities are prohibited.
11.17. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the Conference of States Parties in accordance with Articles 14 (Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement).
11.18. Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 3 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities are permitted.[83]
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12. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles
12.1. All deployment, development, testing, production, or acquisition of delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons {Schedule 1} is prohibited, further defined and penalized under World Legislative Act #1 .
12.2. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall disable and dismantle all delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons shall be destroyed according to Article 4 {Phases for Implementation} and the Verification Annex.
12.3. Under direct supervision of the Agency, each State Party shall disable and dismantle all delivery vehicles capable of use for the delivery of nuclear weapons or non-nuclear weapons {Schedule 2} according to Article 4 {Phases for Implementation} or converted the delivery vehicle for purposes not prohibited under this Act or other world legislation.
Schedule 1 – Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles to Be Dismantled
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
Heavy Bombers
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Ground Launched Cruise Missile[84]
Schedule 2 – Delivery Vehicles To be Dismantled or Converted
Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles
Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
Air Launched Cruise Missile
Sea Launched Cruise Missile
Nuclear-capable fighter bombers
Cruise Missile Submarines
Attack Submarines
Warships
[Schedule 3 – Transport Vehicles Not Designed for Nuclear Weapons to be Subject to Preventive Controls][85]
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13. Activities Not Prohibited Under World Legislation
13.1. Each State Party has the power, subject to the provisions of this Act [and other world legislation or agreements and regulations relating to nuclear material] to world federal cooperation for the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Earth Federation exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control over nuclear energy activities.
13.2. Each State Party shall comply with the necessary measures to ensure that research, development and use of nuclear energy within its territory or under its control is undertaken only for purposes not prohibited under this Act or other world legislation. To this end, and to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Act and other world legislation, each State Party shall subject nuclear facilities and nuclear material listed in the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment of this Act, or any other activities so declared by the Agency, to control and verification measures as provided in Articles 5 (Verification), 6 (National Implementation Measures), 8 (Agency), 10 (Nuclear Material), 11 (Nuclear Facilities) [and the Verification Annex].
13.3. Reserved.[86]
13.4. In the exercise of military activities not prohibited under world legislation, each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that [weapons and] weapons delivery systems are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, tested or deployed in a manner consistent with world legislation. To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this world legislation, each State Party shall subject weapons delivery systems including command, communication, control and production facilities to control and verification measures as provided in Section 12 (Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles)[87] [and the Verification Annex].
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14. Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement
Consultation, Cooperation, and Fact-finding
(Section “XIV.A.” A/62/650)
14.01. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Agency or other appropriate world federal or international procedures,, on any matter which people might raise relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Act.
14.02. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification, destruction and conversion regimes, with a view to developing specific measures to enhance the efficient, safe and cost-effective verification, disabling, dismantling and conversion procedures and methods of this Act and other world legislation.
14.03. Without prejudice to the power of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with world legislation, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify a possible threat of use of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Act affects the power of any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which might cause doubt about compliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which might be considered ambiguous. Arrangements shall not affect the powers and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of world legislation.
Procedure for requesting clarification
14.04. A State Party has the power to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which might be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with world legislation. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in Council possession relevant to this concern.
14.05. A State Party has the power to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which might be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the other State Party’s possible non-compliance with world legislation. In this case, the following provisions apply:
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14.05.1. The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than [24] hours after request receipt;
14.05.2. The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify possible threat or use of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter;
14.05.3. The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward the clarification to the requesting State Party not later than [24] hours after clarification receipt;
14.05.4. If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, the requesting State Party has the power to request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification;
14.05.5. For obtaining further clarification requested under subparagraph 14.05.4, the Executive Council may call on the Director-General to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council;
14.05.6. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under subparagraphs 14.05.4
and 14.05.5 to be unsatisfactory, the requesting State Party has the power to request a special session of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council are entitled to participate. In a special session, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any appropriate measure to resolve the situation.
14.06. A State Party also has the power to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation that might be ambiguous or has given rise to a concern about possible noncompliance with world legislation. The Executive Council shall respond by providing assistance as appropriate.
14.07. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request for clarification provided in this Article.
14.08. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has not been resolved within [60] days after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or the State Party believes doubts warrant urgent consideration, notwithstanding the State Party’s power to request a challenge inspection, the State Party may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article 8 {Agency}. At the special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure appropriate to resolve the situation.
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Procedures for challenge inspections
14.09. Each State Party has the power to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible noncompliance with the provisions of this Act or other world legislation relating to military disarmament, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the Verification Annex.
14.10. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the scope of this Act or world legislation relating to military disarmament and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance as specified in the Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. The Agency shall implement the challenge inspection for determining facts relating to the possible non-compliance.
14.11. For verifying compliance with the provisions of, world legislation, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 14.09.
14.12. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State Party has:
14.12.1. The power and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate compliance with this world legislation and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfill the inspection mandate;
14.12.2. The obligation to provide access within the requested site for establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance; and
14.12.3. The power to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to world legislation.
14.13. With regard to an observer, the following provisions apply:
14.13.1. The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party,,send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.
14.13.2. The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex.
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14.13.3. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, the Agency shall record that fact in the final report.
14.14. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for immediate processing.
14.15. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain whether the inspection request meets the requirements specified in the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfills the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.
14.16. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility or site point of entry.
14.17. After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-General’s actions on the request and shall keep the case under consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, Executive Council deliberations must not delay the inspection process.
14.18. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if the Executive Council considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of world legislation as described in paragraph 14.09. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in the decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, the Agency shall stop preparations, the Agency shall take no further action on the inspection request, and the Executive Council shall inform the States Parties concerned accordingly. States Parties may immediately appeal any decision against challenge inspection to the World Ombudsmus.
14.19. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection. An inspection mandate is the inspection request referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 put into operational terms; the inspection mandate shall conform with the inspection request.
14.20. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Verification Annex. The principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of the mandate’s mission shall guide the inspection team.
14.21. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate the inspection team’s task. If the inspected State Party proposes, pursuant to the Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with world legislation, alternative to full and comprehensive access, the inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating compliance.
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14.22. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the
inspected States Parties, as well as the views of any other States Parties conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties.
14.23. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with Council powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection team as soon as the inspection team presents the final report, and address any concerns as to:
14.23.1. Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
14.23.2. Whether the request had been within the scope of world legislation; and
14.23.3. Whether the power to request a challenge inspection had been abused.
14.24. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action might be necessary with regard to Article paragraph 14.23, the Executive Council shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance with world legislation, including specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection.
14.25. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party have the power to participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the Conference regarding the outcome of the process.
14.26. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Article paragraphs 14.27 through 14.31.
Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance (Section “XIV.B.” A/62/650)
14.27. The Conference, taking into account the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 14.28, 14.29 and 14.30 to ensure compliance with this Act and other world legislation regarding military disarmament and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of world law.
14.28. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to compliance and fails to fulfill the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party
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from the exercise of State Party powers and privileges under this Act until the Conference decides otherwise.
14.29. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of world legislation might result from noncompliance with the basic obligations of this Act, the Conference may recommend to States Parties measures which are in conformity with the Earth Constitution and world law. Such measures may include restrictions or suspensions of all assistance in nuclear activities outlined in Schedule 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment. If the State concerned continues in its failure to comply with the request, the World Attorneys General may intervene with warrants.
14.30. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information, conclusions and recommendations, to the attention of the Presidium and the World Attorneys General office.
14.31. The threat or use of nuclear weapons is a threat to the peace subject to the provisions of world law, specifically to World Legislative Acts #1, #12, #13, #14, #19, and other world legislative acts.
Settlement of Disputes (Section “XIV.C.” A/62/650)
14.32. The Enforcement System and the World Courts shall settle disputes that might arise concerning the application, implementation or interpretation of this Act in accordance with the relevant provisions of world legislation, including Article 14., Section 2., of this Act, and in conformity with the provisions of the Earth Constitution.
14.33. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Agency, relating to the application, implementation or interpretation of this Act, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation, mediation, arbitration or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of the Earth Federation: to the Conflict Resolution Department, or the World Ombudsmus. If the dispute is between a State Party and the Agency, either may draw recourse to the World Bench for Public Cases. .
14.34. If other peaceful means of settlement are not found, a State Party in dispute with one or more States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, in conformity with the Statute of the Court [and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes]. The States Parties involved shall inform the Executive Council of actions being taken.
14.35. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by appropriate means, including offering of good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
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14.36. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to the Conference’s attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article 8 {Agency}.
14.37. The Conference and the Executive Council may request the Advisory Bench of the World Court System to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Agency.
14.38. Provisions 14.32 through 14.38 are without prejudice to Sections 14.01 through 14.31.
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15. Entry Into Force
Conditions of Entry Into Force (Section “XV.A.” A/62/650)
15.1. This Act enters into force [180][88] days after the date on which any of the following conditions are met:
15.1.1. 25 States have deposited preliminary instruments of ratification of the Earth Constitution, or
15.1.2. 100 World Electoral and Administrative Districts have deposited instruments of ratification of the Earth Constitution, or
15.1.3. Any equivalent combination of States giving preliminary ratification and World Electoral and Administrative Districts giving final ratification deposit respective instruments of ratification of the Earth Constitution.
15.2. For States and World Districts whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the initial entry into force of this Act, the Act shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the respective State’s or the respective World District’s instrument of ratification or accession.
15.3. State failure to ratify the Earth Constitution does not provide individual immunity from prosecution for violation of world legislation, whether the individual suspect is a citizen or a resident of a non-ratifying state, or whether the alleged crime was committed from within a non-ratifying state. There is no statute of limitations for violation of world law.
15.4. Article 20 of this Act enters into force immediately upon Act adoption by the Provisional World Parliament under the terms of Article 20.21 of this Act, whether or not the remainder of the Act has come into force under Article provisions 15.1, and 15.2.
State Waiver of Entry Into Force Requirements (Section “XV.B.” A/62/650)
For States or World Districts that waive the entry into force requirements, this Act enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the respective instrument of ratification or accession to the Earth Constitution.
16. Financing
16.1. States Parties shall loan the costs of the Agency’s activities in accordance with the a scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in States capacities. The Conference shall develop the scale of assessment by universal ballot procedures. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification and compliance costs.
16.2. Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of disabling and dismantling of weapons and nuclear facilities, and sequestration of proscribed[89] nuclear material under the respective state’s former authority. Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of verification of nuclear facilities under the State’s authority, except for instances of challenge inspections, which are funded according to the provisions of the Verification Annex.
16.3. The Earth Financial Credit Corporation shall fund to assist any State Party to comply with 16.2, if compliance imposes undue financial burdens on that State.
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17. Amendments
17.1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Act. Any State Party may also propose changes, as specified in Article paragraph 17.4, to the Annexes of this Act. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in Article paragraphs 17.2 and 17.3. Proposals for changes, as specified in Article paragraph 17.4, shall be subject to the procedures in Article paragraph 17.5.
17.2. Any State Party may submit the text of a proposed amendment to the Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and to the Depositary. An Amendment Conference may consider the proposed amendment. The Amendment Conference shall convene if one third or more of the States Parties notify the Director-General [not later than [60 days] after its circulation] in support of further consideration of the proposal. The Amendment Conference shall convene immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
Adoption by the Amendment Conference places the proposal as an initiative into the agenda of the World Parliament.
17.3. Amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties 20 days after adoption by any two Houses of the World Parliament, unless the World Parliament adopted amendment version specifies a different entry into force.
If a decision is not reached by the end of the session year, World Disarmament Agency amendment initiatives carry automatically to the agenda of the next session year. The World Parliament may amend this Act or any world legislation with or without an Agency amendment conference.
17.4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Act, provisions in the Annexes are subject to changes in accordance with Article paragraph 17.5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature.
17.5. The Agency may make proposed changes referred to in Article paragraph 17.4 in accordance with the following procedures:
17.5.1. Writers transmit the text of the proposed changes together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Any State Party or the Director-General may provide additional information for the evaluation of the proposal. The Director-General shall promptly communicate proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;
17.5.2. Not later than 60 days after proposal receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine possible consequences for the provisions of world legislation and amendment implementation and shall communicate any respective information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
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17.5.3. The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available, including whether the proposal fulfills the requirements of Article paragraph 17.4. Not later than 90 days after receipt, the Executive Council shall notify a recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
17.5.4. If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, the proposal is approved if no State Party objects to the proposal within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, the proposal is rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;
17.5.5. If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under subparagraph d, a decision on the proposal, including whether the proposal fulfills the requirements of Article paragraph 17.4, will be a matter of substance by the Conference at the next Conference session;
17.5.6. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;
17.5.7. Changes approved under this procedure enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
17.5.8. Changes to the Annexes do not require prior approval by the World Parliament. The World Parliament may immediately review, amend, or annul changes of an administrative or a technical nature by absolute majority decision of the House of Counsellors.
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18. Scope and Application of Act
Relation to other International Agreements (Section “XVIII.A.” A/62/650)
18.1. World Courts and Enforcement must not Nothing interpret this Act to in any way limit or detract from the obligations assumed by any State under international laws and conventions, except for any obligations requiring any state to act contrary to world legislation, world due process and the Earth Federation. Applicable agreements include the following: the United Nations Charter; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty;[90] any other treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. (or Commonwealth of Independent States) on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. (or Commonwealth of Independent States) on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,[91] or under agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
18.2. Pursuant to Article 8 {Agency}, the Agency may enter into agreements with the
implementing organizations of other international agreements for the purpose of sharing information necessary or applicable to the verification tasks of each organization involved, or for any other purposes that would further the objectives of the international agreements concerned.
Status of the Annexes (Section “XVIII.B.” A/62/650)
18.3. The Annexes form an integral part of this Act. Any reference to this Act includes the Annexes.
Duration and Withdrawal (Section “XVIII.C.” A/62/650)
18.4. This Act is of unlimited duration.
18.5. Withdrawal from this Act is not permitted.
Reservations (Section “XVIII.D.” A/62/650)
18.6. The Articles of this Act are not subject to reservations by States Parties. The Annexes of this Act are not subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Act. An Amendment Conference may recommend reservations. The World Parliament may adopt reservations consistent with the objects and purposes of the Earth Constitution.
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19. Conclusion
Signature (Section “XIX.A.” A/62/650)
19.1. This Act is not open for signature for any States before or after the Act’s entry into force. However, the constitutive document, the Earth Constitution, is open for signature for all States before and after entry into force.
Ratification (Section “XIX.B.” A/62/650)
19.2. This Act is not subject to ratification by States Signatories to the Earth Constitution according to the States’ respective constitutional processes.
Accession (Section “XIX.C.” A/62/650)
3. Any State which does not sign the Earth Constitution before this Act’s entry into force may accede to the Earth Constitution and thereby this Act at any time thereafter.
Depository (Section “XIX.D.” A/62/650)
19.4. The Presidium of the Earth Federation is hereby designated as the Depository of this Act and shall, inter alia:
19.4.1. Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification to the Earth Constitution or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Act, and of the receipt of other notices;
19.4.2. Transmit duly certified copies of this Act to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States; and
19.4.3. Reserved.
19.4.4. The Presidium may transmit copies of the Act to other states, agencies and international organizations.
Authentic Texts (Section “XIX.E.” A/62/650)
19.5. Upon translation and review, the Commission for Legislative Review shall deposit this Act, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and Esperanto texts are equally authentic, with the Presidium. The Commission for Legislative Review may also deposit language text versions with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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20. Depleted Uranium Specifications
Article 20.01 Depleted Uranium Definitions
20.01.1. “Uranium ammunition” means munitions with uranium anchors which may, by reason of its high density and hardness, penetrate amour steel,
20.01.2. “Uranium armour-plate” means an armour, which contains depleted uranium to make the armour harder and resistant to be shot through,
20.01.3. “Uranium weapon” means a mechanism that serves to destroy or damage objects and uses depleted uranium in its mode of action,
20.01.4. “Contaminated area” or “contaminated waters” means an area or waters which have been contaminated by reason of the use of uranium ammunition,
20.01.5. “Decontamination” means the abolishment of the radiation effect as well as of other consequences that have been caused by the use of uranium weapons and have negative effects on the human health,
20.01.6. “Transfer” covers the physical take of uranium ammunition or uranium armour-plate to or from a state territory as well as the transfer of that title to uranium ammunition and to the control over uranium ammunition,
20.01.7. “Pre-Product” means the chemical reaction component that is used at any stage during any type of production of uranium ammunition or uranium weaponry, especially the radioactive waste.
20.01.8. “Uranium ammunition production facility” means facilities in which uranium ammunition is being developed, produced or brought to perfection,
Article 20.02?General obligations
20.02.1. In addition to previously cited statutory prohibitions of uranium bombs under World Legislative Acts #1 and #13, elemental uranium and uranium alloy armor plate is also prohibited. Uranium elemental or alloy armor plate classifies and lists as a weapon of mass destruction. Each of the provisions of World Legislative Act #1 and World Legislative Act #13 apply also to the uranium armor plate.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Enforcement System office of the Agency for Research and Planning of the Earth Federation may commence plans for vitrification of uranium within the form of glass fibers that may be used only with non-flammable epoxies for the production of composite armor plates or other components for use in police vehicles of the Earth Federation and civil police sub-jurisdictions within the Earth Federation, or other use by the Earth Federation, such as for space construction. The standard is to provide complete protection from exposure to ionizing radiation, including during the production process and the decommissioning process. If a procedure for freighting to space is developed, the Earth Federation may also ship the fibers into space. To reduce the possibility of confusion with ordinary glass fibers, the vitrification process will include identifiers to distinguish the fibers, such as colorants. The Agency for Research and Planning will submit its plans to the Agency for Technological and Environmental Assessment (ATEA) to conduct an ongoing environmental impact study (EIS) on this proposed system of vitrification, and will report its findings to the World Parliament on no less than an annual basis. In the EIS, the ATEA shall include impact considerations regarding other issues, such as the impact of the use and disposal of the flame retardant epoxies, and protection for workers in all steps of production use and decommissioning.
Acquisition and disposal of would-be pre-products for development and production of uranium weapons including plate is an exclusive function of the World Disarmament Agency. Unauthorized acquisition is illegal (class 6 felony). Unauthorized disposal is illegal (class 7 felony);
20.02.2. Each State Party to Earth Constitution undertakes to place uranium ammunition, uranium armour-plate, other uranium weapons or the pre-products for development and production the State Party owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, under immediate supervision, dismantlement and secure sequestration procedures of the World Disarmament Agency.
20.02.3. Every State Party to Earth Constitution undertakes to cooperate with the World Disarmament Agency in the dismantlement of any uranium ammunition-, uranium armour-plate- and other uranium weapon production facilities the State Party has owned or possessed, or that are located in any place under State Party jurisdiction or control.
20.02.4. The World Disarmament Agency shall transform depleted uranium, produced or left over during the dismantlement of uranium ammunition or of production establishments, into a stabile chemical compound if feasible and to store depleted uranium element in a safe final storage under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency. The preparation for storage may include vitrification processes if vitrification process is deemed adequately safe by the World Disarmament Agency.
20.03. Uranium Recovery Centre
20.03.1. A Uranium Recovery Centre is hereby established. The Uranium Recovery Centre is a sub-department of the Remedies and Corrections Department of the Enforcement System. The Uranium Recovery Centre shall report quarterly on the fulfillment of the DU statute obligations to the Secretary-General of the World Administration and to the Board of Trustees of the World Disarmament Agency.
20.03.2. The Uranium Recovery Centre shall develop and provide a data base with unrestrictedly accessible information, which shall be supplied by the States Parties 90 days after its establishment at the latest and shall maintain the data base for the use by the World Disarmament Agency and other agencies of the Earth Federation.
20.03.3. In agreement with the Civil Service Administration of the Earth Federation, the Uranium Recovery Centre shall provide and update a list of qualified experts. The list shall contain names, qualifications, nationality and other suitable data of the experts participating in the fact-finding mission. The list is public, available to States Parties on request. If employed by the Uranium Recovery Centre, qualified experts shall offer advice for the Centre or any agency of Earth Federation as requested.
Article 20.04. ?Decontamination of uranium contaminated areas
20.04.1. The Earth Federation undertakes to decontaminate or to guarantee the decontamination of areas under Earth Federation jurisdiction or control, which have been contaminated with depleted uranium by military force actions or any other reason, as soon as feasible. The Uranium Recovery Centre, in coordination with the Commission for Legislative Review and other agencies of the Integrative Complex, shall prepare an Additional Protocol to this Statute for decontamination of previously contaminated areas .
20.04.2. Each State Party shall cooperate with Earth Federation endeavours to identify and mark all areas under Earth Federation jurisdiction or control where uranium ammunition has been used notoriously or presumably, especially theatres of operation, military training grounds and scenes of accident.
20.04.3. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) mandate is amended to include the monitoring of radiation in areas contaminated with depleted uranium. As per the Nuclear Contamination Act (2006), the World Health Organization mandate includes the monitoring of radiation in areas contaminated with depleted uranium. The Earth Federation, the World Health Organization and each State Party shall warn people living in all areas under respective jurisdictions or control where uranium ammunition has been used, notoriously or presumably, of the danger and to afford any support during times until absolute decontamination, especially to isolate the contaminated areas, to adopt precautionary measures through activity-based costing teams (ABC-teams), to inform the population and to conduct health examinations. The Uranium Recovery Centre, in coordination with the Commission for Legislative Review and other agencies of the Integrative Complex, shall prepare an Additional Protocol to this Statute for the medical care of all previously injured. Earth Federation Agencies shall endeavour to cooperate or coordinate with the work of the World Health Organization and with UNSCEAR. Earth Federation Agencies shall endeavour to cooperate or coordinate with the work of the World Health Organization and with UNSCEAR.
The World Health Organization shall submit health care budget projections to the World Financial Administration for expected costs related to the health care of persons subjected to exposure to depleted uranium. WHO shall also submit projections for expected costs related to the necessary increased monitoring of contamination and radiation levels.
20.04.4. As far as considerable danger exists for the health or life of civilians living in contaminated areas, Earth Federation agencies and affected States Party to the Earth Constitution shall endeavour to transfer civilians to other, not contaminated areas until the de-contamination of the danger. The Uranium Recovery Center, in coordination with the agencies of the Integrative Complex, will also submit social care budget projections based on the projected loss of livelihood of displaced persons. Budget projections shall include loss as reported or documented by displaced persons. Budget projections shall include transfer, health care and social care costs to respective States Party to the Earth Constitution, as State Party expenditures may be eligible for disaster relief and reimbursement through the World Financial Administration.
Agencies must respect rights of civilians during any transfer of civilians. Agencies must inform civilians in detail of the medical reasons for relocations. If decontamination personnel are required, the clean-up agencies shall consider the qualifications and placement of affected persons. However, all de-contamination personnel must be fully informed of the risks inherent in the de-contamination work. If affected persons can be involved in the clean-up operations in respective localities, this will reduce the number of displaced persons
20.04.5. States Party to the Earth Constitution, monitoring organizations and persons involved in monitoring contaminated areas shall convey to the Uranium Recovery Centre. the information on contaminated areas, especially theatres of operation, military training grounds, and scenes of accident
20.04.6. This Statute encourages States Party, WHO, Agencies of the Integrative Complex and the Uranium Recovery Centre to make recommendations for the improvement of this Statute to the Commission for Legislative Review and to delegate Members of the World Parliament of contaminated areas. This Statute encourages all world citizens to coordinate with these agencies and representatives for improvement in the implementation of this Act
20.04.7. WHO in coordination with the Agency for Technological and Environmental Assessment shall report annually to the World Parliament on the conducted decontamination of uranium contaminated areas.
Article 20.05? International and world co-operation and support
20.05.1. In fulfilling obligations under this Statute each State Party to the Earth Constitution may seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties with the proviso that no State Party will seek or receive assistance for activities in violation of world legislation or the Earth Constitution.
20.05.2. Each State Party to Earth Constitution undertakes to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Statute and has the right to participate in the interchange.
20.05.3. Every able State Party to Earth Constitution, shall provide help concerning welfare work, medical assistance and rehabilitation as well as social and economic reintegration of the victims of uranium weapons use. States Party shall support programmes with regard to the explanation of dangers of uranium weapons use. The support may be provided directly to and through Earth Federation agencies, or may be provided within the system of the United Nations viable agencies, international, regional and national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on bilateral basis.
20.05.4. Every able State Party shall provide help with the decontamination of uranium contaminated areas and waters. This support may be provided directly to and through Earth Federation agencies, or may be provided within the system of the United Nations viable agencies, international, regional and national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on bilateral basis.
20.05.5. States Parties may request agencies of the Earth Federation, viable agencies of the United Nations, regional organisations, other States Parties or any other inter-governmental or non-governmental committees to support their authorities and national places of contact in the preparation of a domestic decontamination programme to lay down the following among other things:
20.05.5.1. extension and dimension of the problems caused by the use of uranium ammunition,
20.05.5.2. the required financial, technological and personal means for the fulfilment of the programme,
20.05.5.3. the forecasted time period necessary for the decontamination of the areas under jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party,
20.05.5.4. support for the victims of uranium ammunitions use, especially their treatment and transfer to not contaminated areas,
20.05.5.6. the relationship between the government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental institutions, that will be involved in the fulfilment of the programme.
20.05.6. Each State Party to Earth Constitution undertakes to facilitate to supply information and reports to the Uranium Recovery Centre and the Board of Trustees of the World Disarmament Agency, especially about different methods and technologies of decontamination and lists of experts and expert agencies or national contact places.
20.05.7. All States Parties to the Earth Constitution, which provide and receive support on basis of this Article, shall work together with regard to the securing of the entire and immediate fulfillment of the stipulated programmes.
20.05.8. States Party that provide supports shall account for expenses in terms of the Earth unit of currency and credit. States party shall report these expenses to the Earth Federation Funding Corporation. Subject to quality audit by the World Financial Administration, States Party to Earth Constitution are eligible for reimbursement by installments with bonus beginning with the Second Operative Stage of Earth Federation for supports provided as stipulated in this Article 5 of the DU Specifications Statute.
Article 20.06?Partnership
20.06.1. The assistance for the States Parties affected by use of uranium weapons, outlined in Article 20.5 may take place in the form of partnerships among States Parties.
20.06.2. The partnership model covers conception-planning, material and personal support of one State Party to another, which is especially affected by the use of uranium ammunition and not in position to fulfil the obligations of this Statute by its own efforts.
Article 20.07? National implementation measures
20.07.1. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to fulfill obligations under this Statute. To provide for guarantee of equal protection as required by Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, States Party to the Earth Constitution shall enact cooperative enforcement legislation, in order to bring suspected violators to the Earth level of jurisdiction. States Party shall amend national penal codes as may be necessary, to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction and cases of double jeopardy.
20.07.2. In particular, each State Party especially prohibits natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or any other place under its jurisdiction to engage in any activity prohibited for a State Party, natural person or legal person under this Statute. Until the World Parliament determines that cooperative enforcement protocols are not necessary, or are obstructive to justice, law enforcement officers at lower levels of jurisdiction have authorization to carry out warrants, and to make warranted arrests and detentions of natural persons who are suspected of violating world law. Law enforcement officers at the lower level of jurisdiction shall remand suspected violators, as well as collected evidence, to the Enforcement System of Earth Federation as soon as feasible after any arrest, respecting rights of habeas corpus.
20.07.3. Each State Party to Earth Constitution shall co-operate with other States Party within the world law and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of obligations under paragraphs 20.07.1 and 20.07.2. of this Statute. (Further guidelines for cooperative enforcement are in World Legislative Act #20, the World Criminal Bench Statute (originally from the Rome Statute, and from World Legislative Act #24, Procedures and Evidence (virtually identical to States Party version.)
Article 20.08? Assistance and protection against the use of uranium ammunition
States Party to the Earth Constitution shall promptly report to the Enforcement System all cases of threats, suspected detonation or actual detonation of uranium ammunition, as well as any other suspected violations of World Law, together with any supportive evidence to the report of violation. The Enforcement System has authorization to provide assistance and protection by increasing civil World Police patrols in areas that are under threat of use by uranium ammunition. Upon issue of warrant, World Police can arrest persons suspected of violating World Law.
Article 20.09? Meeting of States Parties
20.09.1 Upon formation, the House of Nations shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Statute, including
20.09.1.1. matters that arise from the reports, submitted on basis of this Statute;
20.09.1.2. the international and world co-operation according to Articles 5 and 6 of this Statute,
20.09.1.3. decisions concerning submissions of the States Parties according to Article 4 paragraph 6 of this Statute;
20.09.1.4. revision of reports according to Article 2 paragraph. 5, Article 4 paragraph 7 and Article 14 paragraph 9 of this Statute
20.09.1.5. fulfilling the obligations according to Article 5 paragraph 8 of this Statute.
20.09.2. The first Meeting of House of Nations shall convene within one year after declaration of the first operative stage of Earth Federation. The subsequent meetings shall convene annually beginning on second Monday of January, as per Earth Constitution Article 5F11
20.09.3. The Organizing Committee may invite States not parties to the Earth Constitution, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organisations to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
Article 20.10?Review conferences
20.10.1. The World Parliament will convene a Review Conference session four years after the entry into force of this Article, to review all matters relating to the implementation and further integration of this Article together with all enforcement legislation. The World Parliament may convene further Review Conferences if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than 3 years. The Organizing Committee shall invite all States Parties to Earth Constitution to each Review Conference.
20.10.2. The purposes of the Review Conference are the following:
20.10.2.1. to review the operation and status of this Article and other enforcement statutes of the world legislation,
20.10.2.2. todiscuss and decide organisational structure and the establishment of new authorities,
20.10.2.3. to adopt, if necessary, in its final report, conclusions related to the implementation of this Article .
20.10.3. The organizing committee may invite states not party to Earth Constitution, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organisations to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
Article 20.11 (Original Article 20.3 “Exceptions” stricken. Original Article 20.11 “Uranium Weapons Centre” moved to Article 20.3 as “Uranium Recovery Center” New Articles 20.25 & 20.26 address transfer, transport and stewardship issues.)
Article 20.12?Funds
20.12.1. This Statute establishes a voluntary Uranium Recovery Fund. The Earth Federation Funding Corporation shall administrate the fund. The EFFC shall account for all volunteer contributions to the Fund, for eventual reimbursement with bonuses to funding sources.
20.12.2. The purpose of the fund is to finance expertise about the use of uranium weapons as well as about the dimension of the damage. Disposable funds may finance programmes for uranium decontamination.
20.12.3. Each State Party to Earth Constitution shall announce the amount of its voluntary contribution at the first Meeting of House of Nations.
Article 20.13 ?Clarification of questions
20.13.1. If one or more States Parties to Earth Constitution wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to the compliance with the provisions of this Statute by another State Party, the first State Party (-ies) may submit, through the Office of World Attorneys General, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Submissions shall include all appropriate information. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Office of World Attorneys General, within 4 weeks to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
20.13.2. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Office of World Attorneys General within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, the first State Party may press criminal or civil charges. The World Attorneys General Office shall issue warrants in the case of suspected violations of world criminal statutes. In the case of violations of world civil law or civil conflict, the first State Party may take the case to the International Bench (International Court of Justice), or to the Civil Bench (Permanent Court of Arbitration), whichever is most appropriate, according to the rules of procedure established for those Court Benches.
20.13.3. Between the Meetings of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise its good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
Article 20.14? Fact-finding mission
The Office of World Attorneys General of the Earth Federation appoints members of fact-finding missions out of the list of experts of the Uranium Recovery Centre.
20.14.1. If clarification of a matter is impossible through the coordinating operation of the World Disarmament Agency, the World Attorneys General Office shall warrant a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate conditional upon evidence gathered and witness testimony.
20.14.2. States Party shall provide access for the entry of the fact-finding mission into the territory or any other place under State Party jurisdiction or control.
20.14.3. This Statute recommends the World Attorneys General Office to compose the mission of 9 appointed and authorised experts. However, the World Attorneys General Office may compose the mission with whatever number may be deemed appropriate and feasible. During the provisional operative stage of Earth Federation, the World Attorneys General Office shall appoint the members of the fact-finding mission after consultation of the requested State Party and the Uranium Recovery Centre. The World Attorneys General Office must not appoint for the mission nationals of States Parties requesting the mission or persons in direct cohesion with requesting State Parties. During the provisional stage of Earth Federation, the World Attorneys General Office shall appoint the Mission Administrator from qualified Detectives of the Investigation Department of the Enforcement System. From 6 months after commencement of the first operative stage of Earth Federation, the World Detective shall appoint any Mission Administrator, and shall appoint the members of the fact-finding mission from among the staff of the Investigation Department, as well as from the pool of Experts of the Uranium Recovery Centre.
20.14.4. The World Detective shall designate experts from the list under Article 20.20.3 paragraph 3 of this Statute for members of the mission. Until the World Detective is operating, the World Attorneys General Office shall designate the experts from the list.
20.14.5. The World Attorneys General Office may give 48 hours notice, or other notice regarding the fact-finding mission. However, advance notice is not a legal requirement of any warrant service. Upon assignment, Members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the ordered State Party as soon as feasible.
20.14.6. The members of the fact-finding mission enjoy privileges and immunities as Enforcement Officers under World Legislative Act 37, World Federal Privileges and Immunities (Derived from in-force States Parties Privileges and Immunities, in turn derived from Article VI of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.) The requested State is also responsible for the security of the members of the mission on State Party territory.
20.14.7. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control as well as inspection of documents, as far as necessary to fact-finding, object of the mission or in direct cohesion to the mission.
20.14.8. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for as long as is necessary to complete the warrant service.
20.14.9. The fact-finding mission shall report, to the World Attorneys General Office and to the Board of Trustees of the World Disarmament Agency the results of mission findings. The World Attorneys General Office shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission. Determining a breach of the present Statute by the control, the World Attorneys General Office may issue further search and arrest warrants, or may order the State Party or the World Disarmament Agency to remove the breach of this Statute. or take other measures to address the compliance issue. The ordered State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this order within any time frame designated in the order.
20.14.10. As public enforcement officers,Members of fact-finding missions while engaged in fact-finding duties shall wear and display standard photo identification badges, unless the fact-finding member is engaged in undercover duty assignment related to the mission..
Article 20.15. ?Settlement of Disputes
20.15.1. The States Parties to Earth Constitution shall consult and co-operate with each other to settle disputes that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Statute. Every State Party may bring any such dispute to the Conflict Resolution Department of the Enforcement System.
20.15.2. The Conflict Resolution Department may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering good offices, calling upon the States Party to a dispute to start a settlement procedure and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
20.15.3. The Conflict Resolution Department may request the International Bench (International Court of Justice) to adjudicate the settlement of the dispute, if it can not be settled between the States Parties by mediation or arbitration of the Conflict Resolution Department.
20.15.4. Otherwise it remains reserved to the States Parties to call on the International Court of Justice and ask for a judicial decision.
20.15.5. If upon consultation or investigation there is discovery that the conflict is either a Public Case or a Civil Case, and settlement is not reached, the Conflict Resolution Department, or either Party may bring the dispute to the respective bench (Permanent Court of Arbitration during provisional operative stage of Earth Federation).
Article 20.16?Liability
Individuals are accountable to the provisions of world legislation, whether or not they agree with the World Law. Natural and Legal Persons are accountable for reparations, restitutions and decontamination costs, whether or not the violation is the result of complying with illegal orders to violate the Law. World Court can order payments to be made from any future earnings of convicted violators, though not to exceed an amount to deprive any convict of reasonable decent living. As damage costs from depleted uranium can easily exceed the ability of any natural or legal person to pay, the Earth Federation is responsible to provide decontamination service and social care or to pay the related cost for damages that exceed the capacity of violators to pay.
Article 20.17?Amendments
This Statute recommends that the Uranium Centre, together with the rest of the World Disarmament Agency, and Agencies of the Integrative Complex consider amendment proposals for improvement of this article for presenting to subsequent sessions of the World Parliament. Amendment proponents may submit proposals to the Commission for Legislative Review. Delegate Members of the World Parliament may introduce proposals at sessions of Parliament
Article 20.18?(Reserved)
Article 20.19?(Reserved.)
Article 20.20.? (Reserved.)
Article 20.21?Entry into force
Given the emergency nature of the danger and suffering, this Article 20 of this Act enters into force immediately upon adoption by the Provisional World Parliament. However, civil use enforcement provisions under Article 20.3.3 of this Act enter into force on the first day of the sixth month in which the 20th instrument of the ratification, approval or accession to the Earth Constitution has been deposited.
Article 20.22?(Reserved.)?
Article 20.23?(Reserved.)
Article 20.24?(Reserved.)
Article 20.25.?Transport, transfer and civil use of depleted uranium.
20.25.1. The World Disarmament Agency shall defuse and dismantle depleted uranium weapons on location where stored or deployed, if feasible. If on-site dismantlement is not possible, then the depleted uranium weapons will at least be defused, on location, if feasible. Only the World Disarmament Agency may transport fused or defused depleted uranium weapons, or of the elements of the weapons, and then only in the process of dismantling the weapons and of safe sequester of the depleted uranium. If the uranium weapons cannot be dismantled on location, then the World Disarmament Agency shall determine the nearest dismantlement location for shipment, but may consider transport security when determining shipment destination.
20.25.2. Any transfer of depleted uranium must be only to the World Disarmament Agency. Natural and legal persons interested in transporting depleted uranium under supervision of the World Disarmament Agency must apply for deputization authorization from the World Disarmament Agency. Disarmament Transport Agents must affirm allegiance to the Earth Constitution in solemn undertaking and must agree to comply with all world legislation. The Uranium Recovery Centre in cooperation with the World Civil Service Administration shall determine who is qualified for transport operations. However, the Uranium Recovery Centre shall check with the Penal Department of the Enforcement System to ascertain whether candidates for Disarmament Transport Agents might have disqualifying legal restrictions from performing the service. The Uranium Recovery Centre must not issue authorizations to disqualified persons. The Uranium Recovery Centre shall issue authorization documents to qualified Disarmament Transport Agents, including an identification badge. Disarmament Transport Agents have privileges and immunities as Enforcement Officers as defined in the Statute on World Federal Privileges and Immunities (World Legislative Act #37). While on duty, Disarmament Transport Agents shall bear arms suitable for law enforcement and registered with the World Disarmament Agency, as defined in World Legislative Act #14. Disarmament Transport Agents shall transport in Partner Teams as defined in World Legislative Act #14. The World Disarmament Agency shall provide, if feasible, additional deputized, armed guards to lead and follow in separate vehicles any DU transport vehicles
20.25.3 Civil use of depleted uranium
20.25.3.1. This Statute phases out the private use of depleted uranium
20.25.3.2. Effective immediately, designers shall discontinue plans for use of depleted uranium, in metallic or elemental form, such as for commercial aircraft ballast.
20.25.3.3. This Statute advises Carriers to not accept plans for incorporation of uranium or plutonium as ballasts in the design for aircraft or other vehicles or machinery
20.25.3.4. Civil users, such as Carriers and governments shall submit reports of use of depleted uranium within 12 months from the adoption of this Act, to include full details on the vehicles or machinery, including the design specifications, as well as the schedule of use and maintenance of the vehicle or machinery.
20.25.3.5. Civil users shall also submit budgets to the World Financial Administration for substitution, if feasible, of parts, such as substitution of prohibited ballasts by safe ballasts. Budgets shall include projected costs for research, development, manufacture and testing of the substitution parts. Budgets shall include projected loss of revenues caused by non-use of the vehicle or machinery during the substitution installation and testing.
20.25.3.6. The Uranium Recovery Centre shall coordinate with the Agency for Research and Planning to determine a suitable projected schedule for the phasing out of private use of depleted uranium. The World Financial Administration shall compile the projected budgets for the substitution and phasing out of private use of depleted uranium. The World Financial Administration shall report an overall budget projection to the World Parliament
20.25.3.7. The World Parliament will deliberate the proposed budget to consider subsidizing the planned phase out of private use of uranium and plutonium.
20.25.3.8. When designed substitution is not possible, vehicles or machinery in private use is subject to public condemnation by respective agencies of the Earth Federation. Use of condemned vehicles or machinery is unlawful (class 1 felony)
20.25.3.9. This Statute encourages carriers and other civil users to substitute the depleted uranium, if possible. The World Parliament will consider compensation budget requests from the World Financial Administration in response to compensation budget requests submitted to the World Financial Administration by civil users, if substitution is not feasible and vehicles or machinery is subject to being publicly condemned.
Article 20.26 Uranium Sequestration Repositories
20.26.1. This statute declares depleted uranium, as well as other trans-uranic elements, such as plutonium, to be part of the common heritage of humanity, which means there is no private ownership, no corporate ownership and no national ownership of the trans-uranic elements.
20.26.2. As the depleted uranium weapons and armor are dismantled, the World Disarmament Agency will seek means to safely reposit the element away from, and if feasible outside of the biosphere. Until the Uranium Centre develops or discovers a surely safe process for removing depleted uranium from the biosphere, the Uranium Centre, together with agencies of the Integrative Complex, shall research and implement processes for rendering the uranium to be chemically stable or chemically inert, if feasible. The Uranium Centre and Integrative Complex shall also explore processes such as vitrification. The Uranium Centre and Integrative Complex shall explore combined vitrification with continental plate subduction for the eventual removal of the element from the biosphere, if other safe and reasonable uses of the element are not found.
20.26.3. The World Disarmament Agency, together with agencies of the Integrative Complex, shall design, construct and maintain uranium sequestration repositories for permanent stewardship or for semi-permanent stewardship. The World Disarmament Agency, together with the Agencies of the Integrative Complex shall submit annual budgets and annual reports to the World Parliament for the safe design, construction and maintenance of the repositories.
20.26.4. Until the Earth Federation gathers adequate enforcement strength to construct and maintain Earth Federation uranium sequestration repositories. Provisional repositories may be designed, constructed and operated by organizations and States Party to the Earth Constitution, under the supervisory control of the World Disarmament Agency.
20.26.5. To allow freedom of movement as a protection against possible geological failure of a sequestration repository, or to allow movement in event of civil disturbances that might escalate beyond the control of the Earth Federation Enforcement System, multiple repositories shall be designed, constructed and maintained with an eventual total capacity that exceeds the uranium kept. The Uranium Centre will explore the possibility of repositories in each of the 20 World Regions of the Earth Federation.
Secure safe transport capacity will be designed constructed and maintained, for response readiness against the eventuality of failures at repositories
20.26.6. The uranium sequestration repositories are a permanent stewardship of the Earth Federation. Therefore, there will be no national competitive disadvantage and resulting diminishing budgets or inadequate budgets for nations or states attempting to store this material as waste and through private contracts.
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
The States Parties, expressing their wish to resort to the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court System, including the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement is provided for in world legislation or has been agreed upon by the Parties within a reasonable period, agree as follows: non-criminal disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Act lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application by any party to the dispute being a Party to the Earth Constitution.
Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance
The States Parties to this Protocol:
Desiring to prevent any threat to the aims and objectives of this Act from arising due to the proliferation of nuclear technology which could aid or assist in the development of nuclear weapons,
Desiring further to prevent any threat to health and the environment arising from the excessive creation of radio-nuclides in nuclear reactors,
Affirming the right to the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources,
Have agreed as follows:
1. Not to manufacture, assemble, transfer or otherwise acquire nuclear power reactors.
2. Not to use any existing power reactor, nor the products from the use of any nuclear power reactor.
3. To close any existing nuclear power reactors within [five] years of signing the Earth Constitution.
4. To assist other Parties to this protocol in the development and use of non-nuclear, sustainable energy sources.
5. To create a world federal fund for the purposes of implementing paragraph 4.
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Annex 1. Nuclear Activities[92]
Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1.1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity is included in Schedule 1:
1.1.1. The nuclear activity is specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or under other world legislation
1.1.2. The purpose of the nuclear activity is to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or of other world legislation.
1.1.3. The nuclear activity poses a grave risk to the object and purpose of this Act by virtue of the activity’s high potential for aiding and assisting activities specifically prohibited by this Act and other world legislation.
1.1.4. The nuclear activity has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under world legislation, or alternatively the activity’s use for purposes not prohibited under this Act can be safely substituted by another activity.
1.2. Schedule 1 activities are prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 2
1.3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity is included in Schedule 2:
1.3.1. The nuclear activity is not specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or other world legislation.
1.3.2. The purpose of the nuclear activity is not to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or other world legislation.
1.3.3. The nuclear activity poses some risk to the object and purpose of this Act by virtue of the activity’s potential to aid and assist activities specifically prohibited by this Act or other world legislation.
1.4. Schedule 2 activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the Conference in
accordance with Articles [Agency, Technical Secretariat] and [compliance].
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Guidelines for Schedule 3
1.5. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a nuclear activity is included in Schedule 3:
1.5.1. The nuclear activity not specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or other world legislation.
1.5.2. The nuclear activity’s purpose is not to aid or assist in any activity specifically prohibited under Article I of this Act or other world legislation.
1.5.3. The nuclear activity poses no risk to the object and purpose of this Act or other world legislation.
1.6. Schedule 3 activities are permitted.
Schedules of Nuclear Activities
Schedule 1
(1) Production of nuclear weapons
(2) Use of nuclear weapons
(3) Threat of use of nuclear weapons
(4) Production and any use of special nuclear material
(5) Production of metals or alloys containing plutonium or uranium
(6) Weaponization: This covers the research, development, manufacturing and testing required to make nuclear explosive devices from special fissionable or fusionable material
(7) Nuclear fuel fabrication using plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235
(8) Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any kind utilizing uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium or MOX as a fuel or any reactor designed specifically for plutonium production. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies
(9) Reprocessing of irradiated fuel or irradiation targets containing nuclear-weapons capable material. This includes the use of hot cells and associated equipment.
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(10) Enrichment of uranium in isotope U-235 beyond 20% and any preparatory steps in this process, including the preparation and storage of UCI4 and UF6 enriched to more than 3% in U-235. {The preparation of UC14 and UF6 from natural uranium will not be forbidden by the NWC. After enrichment it should not be stored in this form which would be appropriate feeding material for further enrichment beyond 20%.}
(11) Production, separation, and enrichment of the isotope of plutonium-239 , hydrogen (deuterium), tritium and lithium-6
(12) Production of antiprotons, antimatter, nuclear isomers and super-heavy elements in significant quantities
Schedule 2
(1) Import, construction, use of research and power reactors of any type using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 as a fuel. This includes critical and subcritical assemblies, but excludes reactors specifically designed for plutonium production
(2) Prospecting, mining or processing of ores containing uranium and/or thorium
(3) Preparation of chemical compounds containing uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 and thorium; excluding the preparation of UCI4 and UF6 enriched to more than 3% in U-235
(4) Nuclear fuel fabrication using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235
(5) Production of particle and laser beams
– Production of particle beams for law enforcement, private or personal security is restricted to less lethal technology.
– Research and production of laser beams:
medical tools, industrial processes,
computers & electronics, other
communications technology,
other calibration technologies,
security processes and law
enforcement
-Production of laser beams (any wavelength) for law enforcement, private or personal security is restricted to less lethal technologies.
(6) Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on inertial confinement, including diagnostics
Schedule 3
(1) Application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture:
– soil fertility, irrigation and crop production
– [plant breeding and genetics]
– animal production and health
– insect and pest control
– [food preservation]
– other uses upon approval
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(2) Applications of radiation and isotopes in medicine
– diagnostic and therapeutic medicine including dosimetry
– Radiotherapy by teletherapy and brachytherapy
– nutrition and health-related environmental studies
– other uses upon approval
(3) Application of radiation and isotopes in industrial processes
– Radiography and other non-destructive testing methods
– Industrial process control and quality control
– Radiotracer applications in oil, chemical and metallurgical processes
– Development of water and mineral resources
– Industrial radiation processing
– Other uses upon approval
(4) Applications in research with and production and disposal of radioactive isotopes and elementary particles
– Conditioning and disposal of radioactive wastes
– Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on magnetic confinement, including diagnostics
– Production of isotopes both radioactive and stable. The production of the isotope Pu-239, titanium and lithium-6 is prohibited.
– Import, construction and use of neutron sources, electron accelerators, particle accelerators, heavy ion accelerators
– Research on radiation physics and chemistry and on the physical and chemical properties of isotopes except in areas relevant to activities not prohibited by or subject to authorization
under this Convention
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Annex 2. Nuclear Weapon Components[93]
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1. A component is included in Schedule 1 if the component is produced solely for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
2. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 1 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 2
3. The following criteria is taken into account in considering whether a component is included in Schedule 2:
3.1. The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
3.2. The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under world legislation, but is not produced in large commercial quantities for legal purposes.
3.3. There exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (b).
4. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 2 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 3
5. The following criteria is taken into account in considering whether a component is included in Schedule 3:
5.1. The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
5.2. The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under world legislation, but is
not produced in large commercial quantities for these purposes.
5.3. There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (b).
6. Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 3 components is permitted only in
accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
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Guidelines for Schedule 4
7. The following criteria is taken into account in considering whether a component is included in Schedule 4:
7.1. The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
7.2. The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under world legislation, and is produced in large commercial quantities for these purposes.
7.3. There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph (7.2).
8. Manufacture of Schedule 4 components is permitted only in accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
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Annex 3. List of countries and geographical regions for the purpose of Article 8.3.23[94]
Africa
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic
of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Eastern Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
North America and Western Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.
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South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, Viet Nam.
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Annex 4. List of countries with nuclear power reactors[95]
ARGENTINA | ARMENIA |
BELGIUM | BRAZIL |
BULGARIA | CANADA |
CHINA | FINLAND |
FRANCE | GERMANY |
HUNGARY | INDIA |
IRAN | JAPAN |
REPUBLIC OF KOREA | LITHUANIA |
MEXICO | NETHERLANDS |
PAKISTAN | ROMANIA |
RUSSIA | S. AFRICA |
SLOVAKIA | SLOVENIA |
SPAIN | SWEDEN |
SWITZERLAND | UNITED KINGDOM |
UKRAINE | USA |
Annex 5. List of countries and geographical regions with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors[96]
ARGENTINA | ARMENIA |
AUSTRALIA | AUSTRIA |
BANGLADESH | BELARUS |
BELGIUM | BRAZIL |
BULGARIA | CANADA |
CHILE | CHINA |
COLOMBIA | CZECH REPUBLIC |
DPRK | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO |
DENMARK | EGYPT |
EUROPEAN UNION* | FINLAND |
FRANCE | GEORGIA |
GERMANY | GHANA |
GREECE | HUNGARY |
INDIA | INDONESIA |
IRAN | IRAQ |
ISRAEL | ITALY |
JAMAICA | JAPAN |
KAZAKHSTAN | LATVIA |
LIBYA | LITHUANIA |
MALAYSIA | MEXICO |
MOROCCO | NETHERLANDS |
NIGERIA | NORWAY |
PAKISTAN | PERU |
PHILIPPINES | POLAND |
PORTUGAL | REPUBLIC OF KOREA |
ROMANIA | RUSSIA |
SERBIA AND | MONTENEGRO |
SLOVAKIA | SLOVENIA |
SOUTH AFRICA | SPAIN |
SWEDEN | SWITZERLAND |
SYRIA | TAIWAN (PROVINCE OF CHINA) |
THAILAND | TUNISIA |
TURKEY | UNITED KINGDOM |
UKRAINE | USA |
[1] Technical/Legal amendment (TL)
[2] TL
[3] TL
[4] TL
[5] TL
[6] TL
[7] TL
[8] TL
[9] TL
[10] TL
[11] TL
[12] TL
[13] TL
[14] TL
[15] TL
[16] TL
[17] TL
[18] TL
[19] TL
[20] TL
[21] TL
[22] TL
[23] TL
[24] TL
[25] TL
[26] TL
[27] TL
[28] TL
[29] TL
[30] TL
[31] TL
[32] Corrective/Integrative amendment (CI)
[33] CI
[34] TL
[35] TL
[36] TL
[37] TL
[38] TL
[39] TL
[40] Constitutional Consistency amendment (CC)
[41] TL
[42] TL
[43] TL
[44] TL
[45] TL
[46] Constitutional consistency amendment (CC)
[47] CC
[48] CC
[49] Highlighted to draw attention to a point of pending deliberation: seat of the Headquarters.
[50] Highlighted to draw attention to a point of pending deliberation: Membership in the Executive Council.
[51] CI
[52] TL
[53] TL
[54] TL
[55] TL
[56] TL
[57] TL
[58] TL
[59] TL
[60] TL
[61] Highlighted to draw attention to a point of pending deliberation: additional States members.
[62] CI
[63] TL
[64] TL
[65] TL
[66] TL
[67] TL
[68] TL
[69] TL
[70] TL
[71] TL
[72] TL
[73] TL
[74] TL
[75] TL
[76] TL
[77] TL
[78] TL
[79] CI
[80] TL
[81] TL
[82] TL
[83] TL
[84] TL
[85] TL
[86] Constitutional Consistency amendment (CC)
[87] TL
[88] TL
[89] TL
[90] TL
[91] TL
[92] All the Annexes comprise new material, classified here as technical/legal amendments (TL).
[93] All the Annexes comprise new material, classified here as technical/legal amendments (TL).
[94] All the Annexes comprise new material, classified here as technical/legal amendments (TL).
[95] All the Annexes comprise new material, classified here as technical/legal amendments (TL).
[96] TL